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ABSTRACT

NAULT, DANIEL

The Nixon Years: Examining the Evolution
of Federal Disaster Relief Policy, 1969-1974

This thesis examines the evolution of federal disaster relief policy under President
Richard Nixon from 1969-1974. The findings show that even under a conservative
president in Nixon, the federal disaster relief program expanded both in federal resources
and funding consistently during this period. Both Hurricane Camille (1969), and
Hurricane Agnes (1972), served as significant catalysts for this, but also, the liberal
political context of this period coming just after the implementation of the Great Society
program by Lyndon Johnson, and Nixon’s own ambitions to be seen as a proactive leader
despite the ideological contentions it spawned throughout his presidency, played into the
expansion of the federal disaster relief program as well.
To best analyze how and why federal disaster relief policy evolved as it did
between 1969 and 1974, the following examination is organized chronologically; sections
have been devoted to the political background and context of federal disaster relief policy
before Hurricane Camille; the disaster relief effort in the aftermath of Hurricane Camille,
and the discussions to amend the current federal disaster relief legislation from the
Disaster Relief Act of 1969 to the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970; the political effects of
increasing partisanship between the Democratic Congress and the Republicans who
supported Nixon’s administration between 1970-1971, the years leading to Hurricane
Agnes, as well as the federal disaster relief effort in its aftermath under the Agnes
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Recovery Act of 1972; and finally, federal disaster relief hearings in the years following
Agnes leading to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. Throughout each of these sections there
is an emphasized analysis on how partisanship and polarity among the federal
government immediately following Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Agnes differs from
this in the interim of these major catastrophes.
This study relies primarily on the testimony surrounding disaster relief legislation
between 1969-1974 to discern how federal disaster relief policy provisions have changed,
and how the overall scope of federal disaster relief has evolved. As was mentioned, it
especially focuses on the two most catastrophic natural disasters in these years, Hurricane
Camille and Hurricane Agnes, as the two events that were especially influential in the
development of federal disaster relief policy during this time. Furthermore, this thesis
considers the social and political context of this period, drawing on media accounts of
disasters and disaster victims to highlight the heightened sense of entitlement for federal
relief during that emerged during this phase of liberalism.
Lastly, this paper also examines Nixon’s broader domestic policy and seeks to
connect how his influence in the evolution of federal disaster relief policy correlates with
his initiatives in his domestic policy agenda. Upon investigating this, it is clear that the
conservative strains in Nixon’s through were trumped by his personal ambitions and
desires. Ultimately, this influenced his initiative in both federal disaster relief policy and
domestic policy in general during his presidency.
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Chapter 1
For historians and political scientists alike, Ronal Reagan’s ascension to the
presidency in 1981 marked the end of an era of postwar liberalism in Washington. In The
Conservative Century, Gregory Schneider writes, “Ronald Reagan’s election signified
that conservatives had grown up. Barry Goldwater’s defeat in 1964 had inspired
conservatives to take control of the GOP and move it in a conservative direction.” 1 Once
in power, Reagan and his administration prompted the “Reagan Revolution”, challenging
the dominance of the New Deal Democratic regime with a vast series of conservative
reformations to decentralize government and support a laissez-faire economy. After 16
years, Reagan’s ability to appease the American public with staunch conservative policy
put an end to the era of postwar liberalism that had dominated domestic policy in the U.S.
since Lyndon Johnson’s election in 1964. As Steven Hayward asserts, “He (Reagan)
brought the Republican Party to the cusp of realignment”. 2
The most poignant liberal shift in Washington came in 1964 when Lyndon
Johnson won the presidency by the biggest margin since FDR’s landslide victory in 1936.
Additionally, the Democratic Party acquired 37 seats in the House of Representatives,
achieving a 295 to 140 advantage over Republicans there, two more seats in the Senate
raising their number to 68 in total, and 530 seats in state legislatures throughout the U.S.
As Hayward writes “It was the kind of victory from which dreams, and ambitious
legislative programs, are made.” 3 Accordingly, not more than two months into office,

1

Gregory Schneider, The Conservative Century from Reaction to Revolution (Lanham MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2009), 155.
2
Steven F. Hayward, The Age of Reagan: the Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964-1980 (New York: Three
Rivers, 2009), 677.
3
Hayward, The Age of Reagan, 3.
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Johnson embarked on one of the greatest periods of reform in U.S. history, the “Great
Society” program. The Great Society centered on a vast expansion of domestic federal
support towards funding for education, healthcare, domestic poverty, gun control, and the
space program, among other initiatives. Despite its radical platform, the program passed
and as the liberal activism became embedded further into congressional discussions from
both the Republican and Democratic parties, the liberal “push” gained momentum. In
fact, post-war liberalism became so integrated into the mentality of those in Washington
that even some Republicans endorsed the Great Society initiatives. Hayward writes on
this, “When Reagan first arrived on the scene, the liberal Ripon Society was still a major
force in the Republican Party, just as the liberal Americans for Democratic Action was a
significant force in the Democratic Party.” 4
This activism even prompted an unprecedented foray into disaster relief by the
federal government. This was marked by federal disaster relief efforts in 1964, when
Johnson was faced with a catastrophe in Alaska when an earthquake occurred, and 1965
when Hurricane Betsy tore through the Southern U.S. killing 76 people, flooding 160,000
homes, and reaping nearly $1.5 billion in damages. Traditionally, disaster relief had been
the responsibility of the individuals affected and their state or local governments; as well
as volunteer organizations, which often lent their services to the effort. However, Johnson
used the resources of the federal government to provide assistance for victims in Alaska,
and in the areas affected by Hurricane Betsy. While Johnson’s disaster relief effort
calmed victims in Alaska and set a new precedent for federal disaster relief in 1964,
Hurricane Betsy proved to be a far greater catastrophe both in damages and loss of life
than the earthquake in Alaska had and ultimately, the President contributed minuscule
4
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and inconsistent funding for the relief effort a year later. 5 In turn, despite his ambitious
agenda, he failed to sufficiently aid to Betsy’s victims. 6
By 1967, popular support for the Great Society program began to dissolve.
Nonetheless, in his time as president Johnson had not only generated a powerful material
shift in the size of the federal government, but moreover, he had helped alter the
American public’s ideology on the level of domestic support and funding that
Washington was expected to contribute to both state governments and individual citizens;
arguably, this shift represented the culmination of a long-term process rooted in FDR’s
New Deal. This ideology redefined the role of the federal government on domestic issues
and forced politicians in Washington to modify their mentality towards the wants and
expectations of the people they elected to serve.
Coming to power the heels of Lyndon Johnson in 1969 as part of a conservative
backlash to LBJ’s unpopular presidency, Richard Nixon exhibited a particularly effective
adaptation to this post-Great Society mentality and used it to connect with the American
public and achieve his greatest political success. Even as a leader of the conservative
party, Nixon understood the ideological shift the Great Society program had precipitated
and could appreciate the benefits of promoting a liberal domestic agenda at this time.
Nixon declared that in domestic issues, his stance would be guided by “New Federalism”,
the devolution of power from the federal government back to the state.
In a conversation with the President, John Whitaker, a former aid to President
Nixon, reveals that Nixon at one point stated, “There is only one thing as bad as a far left

5

“The Most Intense Hurricanes in the United States 1851-2004,” last modified July 27, 2005,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastint.shtml.
6
National Research Council Committee on the Alaska Earthquake, “The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964
Vol 1. Part 2.” 1970, xi.
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liberal and that’s a damn right wing conservative.” 7 Nonetheless, he also understood that
he was elected to lead for the most part by conservatives, and needed to uphold his
promise to honor their interests as well. Thus, as Whitaker asserts, “Throughout his
career, Nixon’s liberal instincts were held on a tight leash by his conservative
constituency and this political reality constantly led to seemingly contradictory actions
throughout his presidency.” 8
Despite the weight that Nixon’s conservative backers possessed, in his first term
Nixon saw fit to endorse and in some cases, even augment government support on most
of the domestic programs the Great Society had introduced. 9 This was exemplified by his
initiatives on the development of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and his
proposed Family Assistance Plan (FAP) for welfare reform in the U.S. Nixon’s domestic
prerogatives suggest that he did not combat the liberal force the Great Society program
had instituted for domestic policy but rather sought to frame it in a more conservative
light, and in his time as president, Nixon also pushed for federal support on
environmental issues, racial equality, help for minority businesses, and large-scale
initiatives for Native Americans, who up to that point had been largely forgotten in
American society.
Nixon also threw his support into the federal disaster relief program. His
investment in federal disaster relief were highlighted in 1969, when Hurricane Camille
inflicted over $1.4 billion in damage spread throughout the southern United States; and
1972 when Hurricane Agnes ravaged the East Coast inflicting more damage on the U.S.
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John C. Whitaker, “Nixon’s Domestic Policy: Both Liberal and Bold in Retrospect,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 26. 1 (Winter, 1996): 131.
8
John Whitaker, “Nixon’s Domestic Policy,” 131.
9 John Whitaker, “Nixon’s Domestic Policy,” 132-138.
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than any natural disaster in history had up to that point and breaking the record for the
most costly storm with approximately 2.1 billion in damages, mostly from flooding. In
the aftermath of Hurricane Camille, Mississippi in particular, was in a complete state of
crisis. Like Johnson, Nixon chose to embrace what was a previously unprecedented
extension of the federal government into disaster relief. Nixon understood the massive
and complex undertaking disaster relief had historically been, but saw an opportunity to
promote himself as a man of action to the American people, a proactive leader that rose
above the bureaucratic “red tape” in a time of crisis, and could enact a swift production
and implementation of beneficial legislation for victims. Thus, he committed himself and
his government to the relief effort, soliciting the Office of Emergency Preparedness
(OEP) along with numerous other federal and state agencies, churches, and volunteer
relief organizations to contribute food, clothing, shelter, and necessary medical supplies
for victims.
Overall, this network of relief organizations produced an estimated $488 million
for disaster relief, with over $225 million worth of funding stemming directly from the
federal government the largest investment in federal disaster relief of any president up to
that point. 10 In a special message to the Congress on Federal Disaster Assistance on
April 22, 1970, Nixon stated a number of legislative proposals and administrative actions
for he encouraged Congress to approve for improved federal disaster relief legislation. 11
Congress too, especially leaders in federal disaster relief policy legislation like Birch
Bayh, supported the expanded role of the federal government in disaster relief and
10

Philip D. Hearn, Hurricane Camille: Monster Storm of the Gulf Coast (Mississippi: Mississippi
University Press, 2004), 143-146.
11
Richard Nixon: "Special Message to the Congress on Federal Disaster Assistance.," April 22, 1970.
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
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worked with extreme passion to consider the victims’ requests for aid, and contemplate
their criticisms. Ultimately, this led to the production of a significantly more effective
blueprint for the federal disaster relief program deemed the Disaster Assistance Act of
1970. Though never without criticism, the majority of which was directed at local and
state governments as well as the non-profit organizations who had offered their services,
Nixon’s bid paid off and the federal government’s role in the relief effort was considered
a success. Crediting Nixon in this, Hearn writes, “President Richard Nixon’s prediction
that the Gulf Coast would rebuild better than ever was fundamentally fulfilled.” 12
Two years later, President Nixon was confronted once again by Hurricane Agnes,
an overwhelming catastrophe that would require a mammoth relief effort from the federal
government. To make matters more complicated, 1972 marked an election year for
Nixon, and with the race against Senator George McGovern marked the pinnacle of a
partisanship that had emerged between Democrats and Republicans in the period
following Hurricane Camille. Attempting one again to rise to the occasion and promote
himself as a man of action, Nixon responded to the damage and destruction wrought by
Hurricane Agnes just as he had to Hurricane Camille; together he and the OEP initiated a
massive recovery effort, coordinating with all volunteer and local organizations that
wished to help in the effort. Despite Nixon’s increased conservatism during this time, the
scope of Hurricane Agnes prompted the President to propose the Agnes Recovery Act of
1972, an expansion of the 1970 Disaster relief act that among other amendments entailing
increased funding and Federal resources called for supplemental disaster appropriations
totaling $1,569,800,000 for this emergency, the largest single request of its kind in U.S.
history and two years later, a series of congressional hearings assessing the effectiveness
12
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of federal disaster relief in the aftermath of Hurricane Agnes led to the Disaster Relief
Act of 1974, an even greater expansion of federal disaster relief policy. 13
Beginning in 1964, Johnson’s Great Society opened the publics’ eyes to view
their government as an expansive force in domestic affairs. As a result, politicians were
encouraged to adapt more liberal-oriented domestic policies to appease the majority of
the American people. While in office, Nixon understood this dynamic well and with his
desire to be framed as a proactive leader, he made it a priority for his administration to
continue and actively support many of the programs the Great Society program had
initiated. Furthermore, Nixon invested an enormous amount of the federal government’s
resources into the disaster relief campaign following Hurricane Camille. The success of
the federal relief program in 1969 prompted Nixon and Congress to expand upon Federal
disaster relief legislation in 1970. However, between 1970 and 1972 hostility between the
Republicans and Democrats alienated the Nixon administration from liberals in
Washington and prompted him to transition to become more conservative on some of his
domestic policies.
In 1972, Hurricane Agnes once again presented the need for a massive assistance
effort from the Federal government in disaster relief. Though Nixon did undertake a
massive campaign in disaster relief, especially in Pennsylvania, political “red tape” in
Washington hindered the Federal government’s effectiveness and the disaster relief effort
was considered painfully slow and relatively unsuccessful. We must keep Nixon’s
conservative political shift in mind as a contributing factor for why the federal
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James T. Bradley, Horace C. Carter, Crockett C. W. Crockett, Albert V. Hardy, Landers H. Landers, W.
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government left the majority of Agnes victims unhappy, but also look at this phenomenon
in terms of how it affected the evolution and design of disaster relief policy for the future.
The liberal current throughout the 60’s and 70’s that generated a significant
consideration during Nixon’s time in office has attracted both historians and political
scientists alike. Consequently, much has been written on this period and its significance
in the realm of 20th century politics. Three of the most notable of these works are Gregory
Schneider’s The Conservative Century: From Reaction to Revolution, Mackenzie and
Weisbrot’s The Liberal Hour: Washington and the Politics of Change in the 1960’s, and
Allen Matusow’s The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960’s, each
of which comprehensively tracks the liberal undercurrents in Washington throughout the
60’s and 70’s from their beginnings to their end. 14
Mackenzie and Weisbrot, professors of government and history respectively, at
Colby College, examine the political liberalism of the 1960’s and 70’s as a period of
immense social and political change. The Liberal Hour approaches its’ study of post-war
liberalism by exploring what allowed liberalism in the 1960’s and 70’s to take such a
firm grasp on the Washington and the American public, citing a postwar movement of
political power from urban centers to suburbs as well as a decline in southern
conservative influence in the Democratic Party as quintessential catalysts to its
development. Additionally, McKenzie and Weisbrot write on the greatest liberal
domestic policies to emerge from this period including those in welfare reform,
environmental policy, healthcare, civil rights and military consignment policy, and argue

14

Schneider, The Conservative Century: From Reaction to Revolution; Calvin G. Mackenzie and Robert
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that their institution among American domestic policy would not have been possible
without the liberal momentum of the period supporting them.
Matusow’s The Unraveling of America similarly examines the societal effects that
the rise and fall of post-war liberalism had on the U.S. throughout the 60’s and 70’s.
Throughout the book Matusow covers the same major topics as The Liberal Hour does
including anticommunism, civil rights, Great Society programs and the counterculture,
while stressing his own narrative perspective on each. In his newly revised preface to the
book, Mausow explains his sometime critical narrative of the issues explaining, “The
book I wrote was intended as a cautionary tale for liberals in the hope than when their
hour struck again, they might perhaps be fortified against past error. Now that they have
another chance, a look back at the 1960’s might serve them well.” 15 As such, The
Unraveling of America is less concerned with exploring the effects that postwar
liberalism had on the evolution of Nixon’s domestic policy during this time, and is more
focused on critically examining policies that precipitated the return to conservatism in the
1980’s.
Greg Schneider’s The Conservative Century: from Reaction to Revolution, also
explored the liberalism in Washington during this period. In fact, Schneider cites Nixon’s
presidency focusing especially his domestic initiatives as an important representation of
the liberalism that dominated even Republican politicians during the 60’s and 70’s. He
writes, “On the domestic front, the Nixon presidency contributed to the growth of
government and to the growing tax burden the middle class bore to pay for it. Nixon, in
this regard may have been the last liberal president.” 16 However, The Conservative

15
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Schneider, The Conservative Century, 123.
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Century is a far more expansive exploration of conservatism, and Schneider only touches
upon the Great Society program and the politics during the subsequent fifteen years
including Nixon’s presidency, as one of many liberal “pushes” throughout the 20th
century that temporarily dwindled the influence of conservatism in Washington.
Each of the aforementioned publications explores “Great Society Liberalism” and
its lasting effects throughout the 20th century. Schneider examines this period through a
conservative lens, focusing on the reemergence of conservative influence in Washington
upon the decline of liberalism throughout the 60’s and 70’s. While his work does provide
valuable insight on the transitioning political climate throughout this period, his focus is
on the significance of this 16-year period to the Republican Party during this time. As
such, his book does not put a strong focus on Nixon’s liberal mentality as a result of this.
Calvin and Weisbrot, as well as Matusow, approach this topic differently.
Overall, these publications provide a good overview of the political climate that
Nixon presided over during his time in office. However, while both of these books do cite
Nixon in their coverage of this period in history, they are not especially focused on the
Nixon administration and they do not comment on how Nixon’s own aspirations as
president aligned with, or combatted against the political forces surrounding him.
Both The Unraveling of American and The Liberal Hour do in fact, deal with
domestic policy that was influenced by Great Society liberalism and cite the Nixon
administration as a prime subject of this force. In this respect, these two publications are
the most relevant when looking at the influencing factors that shaped Nixon’s disaster
relief campaigns for Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Agnes. Notably, however, each
writer’s focus is on the inconsistency Nixon exhibited in his actions between perpetuating

14

the Great Society programs and appealing to the conservatives who elected him. As such,
they do not particularly delve into Nixon’s own ideology towards framing liberal
initiatives in a conservative light for domestic policy, nor do they provided an analysis
for his disaster relief efforts in 1969 and 1972. Thus, when trying to answer the question
of how much post-war liberalism influenced Nixon’s domestic strategy and agenda, these
works only contribute by exploring the liberal forces present during the Nixon
presidency.
While Calvin and Weisbrot along with Matusow do give the most comprehensive
examination of Nixon’s liberal policy in their investigation of liberalism throughout the
60’s and 70’s, both The Liberal Hour and The Unraveling of America are simply at the
perimeter of this subject. To supplement these works, both historians of the Nixon
presidency and political scientists interested in his domestic agenda have researched
Nixon’s domestic policies in depth and how he utilized his liberal initiatives. As Carl
Liberman writes, “Nixon believed some of these domestic issues were potent political
medicine”. 17 These scholars have particularly interested themselves in Nixon’s initiatives
on welfare reform and Martin Anderson’s Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare
Reform In the United States as well as Lieberman’s Richard M. Nixon: Politician,
President, Administrator both have provided well-researched studies on the political
dynamics involved in Nixon’s domestic strategy, as a conservative president pushing to
reform the welfare system during his time in office. 18 Additionally, Herbert Stein’s

17 Carl Lieberman, Richard M. Nixon: Politician, President, Administrator (New York: Greenwood, 1991),
61.
18
Martin Anderson, Welfare: the Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States (Stanford:
Hoover Institution, 1980); Lieberman, Richard M. Nixon: Politician, President, Administrator.
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Presidential Economics: the Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and
Beyond contributes insight on the liberalism engrained in Nixon’s economic policies. 19
Many scholarly publications have also focused themselves from the perspective of
the liberal foundation of most of President Nixon’s domestic policies. These include Paul
Light’s The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, and
two essays on the subject entitled “A Retrospective on Richard M. Nixon’s Domestic
Policies”, by Richard Nathan, and “Nixon’s Domestic Policy: Both Liberal and Bold in
Retrospect” by John Whitaker. 20 Each of these works expands on Nixon’s endorsement
of many of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs, and while they acknowledge the
existence of a liberal force that influenced politics in Washington, these authors argue
that Nixon’s domestic agenda was not all based upon the cynical calculation of liberal
versus conservative constituents, but that the President was far more liberal minded in
domestic issues than those before him; and that this was the predominate characteristic in
the assumption of a liberal domestic agenda.
With their studies on the liberal foundations of Nixon’s domestic policies, Light,
Nathan, and Whitaker’s publications contribute more on the amount that postwar
liberalism that affected Nixon’s policies than the straight analysis of domestic policy that
Anderson, Lieberman, and Stein provide. Yet, while each of these works do credit Nixon
with some of his own liberal initiatives in action towards domestic policy, they do not
comprehensively explore the politics behind these initiatives taking into account

19

Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: the Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and
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Congress and the public’s influence on this; a concern which certainly influenced the
evolution of Nixon’s domestic agenda and his proposals towards disaster relief.
However, Joan Hoff’s Nixon Reconsidered does focus on Nixon’s own domestic
initiatives stemming from the liberal momentum that influenced Washington during his
terms in office. In Nixon Reconsidered, Hoff, a professor of history at Montana State
University advocates that Nixon was one of most innovative modern presidents on the
matter of domestic policy. 21 While her research on Nixon’s own initiatives in domestic
policy contribute a different perspective on the overall forces behind his domestic
agenda, Hoff also acknowledges Nixon’s desire to be a man of action and comments on
how that factored into his domestic agenda. As such, Nixon Reconsidered is the most
valuable publication to this study when considering how Nixon’s own personality and
ambitions factored into the evolution of disaster relief policy and his domestic agenda in
general.
Nonetheless, it is important to consider that Nixon Reconsidered in large part is
written to shed light on the many successes of Nixon, whose impeachment after
Watergate marred much of the positivity and credit his legacy may have otherwise held.
In a review of the book by Karl Helicher, he comments, “Unlike most Nixon revisionists,
Hoff believes that Nixon’s obstruction of justice during Watergate warranted
impeachment but that his overall accomplishments and his numerous books will insure
his rehabilitation.” 22
While there has been an impressive scope of literature covering both postwar
liberalism during the 60’s and 70’s, and how Nixon’s domestic agenda was influenced by
21

Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic, 1994).
While I tried to find a scholarly review of Nixon Reconsidered, I was unable to and therefore had to
resort to editorial reviews; Karl Helicher, “Review: Nixon Reconsidered, ” Library Journal 1994.
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this movement, almost nothing has been written on how this “Great Society Liberalism”
may have factored into Nixon’s vast investment in federal disaster relief for Hurricane
Camille in 1969 and Hurricane Agnes in 1972. 23 Disaster relief policy has been
addressed by prominent political scientists, most significantly in Peter May’s Recovering
from Catastrophes: Federal Disaster Relief Policy and Politics, and by other scholars,
including national security expert James Miskel’s book entitled Disaster Response and
Homeland Security: What Works, What Doesn’t. 24 However, these books are written
largely to educate today’s policy makers on past mistakes, and as such, each of these
books use historical examples of disaster relief as evidence to support a particular policy
position. 25
Furthermore, while these authors do acknowledge an expansion of federal disaster
relief between 1950-1980 and explore the political effects of expanded disaster relief,
Miskel writing does not greatly expand on the influence of the political context in which
these policy decisions were made or inquire into Nixon’s disaster relief policy as an
example of this. Nonetheless, May, in Recovering from Catastrophes, does briefly
comment postwar government growth and discusses more in depth how the Nixon
administration utilized federal disaster relief for political gain.
In one instance of this, May uses Nixon as example to show the effect that
election years have on the number of presidential disaster declarations made. In his
findings, May shows that Nixon utilized his discretionary power to grant major disaster
23

For Hoff, and most other Historians and Political Scientists studying Nixon. Disasters like Hurricane
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24
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declarations by increasing the amount of state requests for federal disaster relief he
granted in election years. Moreover, May’s research also reinforces the theory that
Nixon’s desired to promote himself as a man of action; by exhibiting that Nixon’s
approval rate for major disaster declaration requests was significantly higher both in
election and non election years than both President Ford or President Carter’s approval
rates were. 26
May also analyzes the way in which major disasters and federal disaster relief
efforts affect politics of disaster relief a macro scale, and influences the evolution of
future disaster relief programs. Writing on this, May asserts:
With respect to the analysis of the history of disaster relief policy, it is
important to remember that many of the legislated changes in disaster
relief provisions have taken place in the aftermath of catastrophic
disasters. This has two influences upon overall policy, perhaps
characterized together as a “rachet-like effect. First, the policy at any point
in time is likely to be defined in terms of the most recent extreme event,
thereby skewing disaster policy more generally toward extreme events.
Second, the recurrence of catastrophic disasters has become occasion for
further expanding the scope of and opportunities for future disaster
assistance. 27

With this in mind, May’s insights into the politics of disaster relief will be useful when
analyzing the effects of Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Agnes to the evolution of
disaster relief policy. As such, Recovering from Catastrophes is quintessential to this
study.
In 1969, Nixon, a well know conservative who served in the White House under
General Dwight Eisenhower for eight years, made history as president making the largest
investment in federal flood relief up to that point. In 1972, Nixon once again met the

26
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May, Recovering from Catastrophes, 113.
May, Recovering from Catastrophes, 9.
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destruction of Hurricane Agnes with an even greater investment in the Federal relief
effort. Prior to the Great Alaska earthquake in 1964, natural disaster relief had been
consigned to state government and the individuals affected. However, the enormity of the
destruction caused by Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Agnes augmented the concerns
for disaster relief to be felt on a national scope. Furthermore, as Hoff argues, Nixon
wished to be view as a man of action and with the emergence of the Great Society
program and the liberal current it produced throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, in order to
create this legacy the President had to appease a greater expectation by the American
public for federal assistance in a variety of areas, including disaster relief.
Given this, there is evidence to suggest that in accordance with the liberal
mentality that dominated Washington throughout his time as president, Nixon adapted a
far more liberal domestic policy and concerned his administration far more with the relief
efforts for both Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Agnes than he would have given his
own political inclinations. Nonetheless, despite these forces, Nixon’s shift to
conservatism after Hurricane Camille led his domestic policy to become increasingly
focused on promoting himself as an effective leader while framing Congress as
incompetent. This caused dissention between the President and Congress in Washington,
and in turn, the Nixon administration was forced to deal with more direct criticism for
their part in the disaster relief effort following Hurricane Agnes than they had following
Hurricane Camille.
This thesis will look in detail at the disaster relief efforts following both
Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Agnes, as well as following the evolution of Federal
disaster relief policy through the amendments to disaster relief legislation, all while

20

considering Nixon’s political strategy and his greater domestic agenda in the context of
postwar liberalism. By doing so we can examine the effects of Hurricane Camille,
Hurricane Agnes, President Nixon’s political strategy, his overall domestic agenda, and
the liberal political context this was all set in, and establish how each of these variables
affected the evolution of disaster relief policy for the future.

Chapter 2
In 1955, the Democratic Party narrowly won the Senate by just a single seat and a
House majority of 29 Democrats in the 84th U.S. Congress. With the support of
charismatic leaders like Sam Rayburn, who served as the Speaker of the House for eight
consecutive years beginning in 1955, the Democrats were not only able to keep
possession of the majorities of both houses in Congress, they were able to consistently
increase it throughout the years. By 1964, when the Great Society legislation was being
voted on in the 18th Congress, the Democrats held a 36 seat advantage in the Senate and a
155 seat majority in the House; an increase of 15% and 6% respectively in just 10 years.
Expanding on policies from Kennedy’s “New Frontier” program, nine years later
Johnson and other top Democratic leaders in Congress passed proposals in an attempt to
eliminate poverty and lend more support in welfare, education, Medicare, Medicaid,
transportation, the environment, and federal labor regulations among other domestic
programs. 1 The complaints and criticisms of the Great Society by conservatives in
Washington proved powerless against the liberal political climate and Democratic
majorities there and bill by bill, Johnson implemented his massive overhaul of federal
domestic policy.
However, these vast changes to the status quo, combined with the racial unrest in
U.S. cities at this time, signified a weakening of law and order to many in the American
public, many of whom were already unsettled by the changes that postwar liberalism had
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already imposed on their lives. Perhaps the most important of these was the spread of
civil rights movement. In his book on 1960’s liberalism, Allen Matusow and claims:
Black protest, northern-style, gathered force for two years before white
liberals fully grasped its significance. First there had been the 1963 school
boycotts in New York, Chicago, and Boston, then the 1964 summer riots
in a handful of East Coast ghettos, and now in the spring of 1965 angry
demands by local black leaders for control of antipoverty programs. It did
not take long to locate the sources of this discontent –de facto segregation,
poverty, and social decay. Fresh from their southern successes, liberals
were initially eager to redress northern grievances too. The question – on
which the national tranquility seemed to increasingly to hinge – was, what
to do? Among liberals seeking answer that spring was Lyndon Johnson. 2

The Great Society sprung a drastic restructuring of federal domestic policy onto the U.S,
public whose societal foundation had already been shaken with the effects that post-war
liberalism had precipitated. Thus, the continuation of these riots in the U.S. shed light on
the “backlash” against Great Society policies that began to become increasingly more
apparent. 3
This backlash worked to combat the Democratic dynasty that had occupied
Washington since 1955, and allowed the Republicans to make significant gains in the
mid-term elections in 1966. In his book The Sixties in America: History, Politics, and
Protest, M.J. Heale explains that as a result of this backlash Republicans did well in the
1966 mid-term elections and won two-thirds of the races for state governor. Thus,
majorities that Johnson had helped to produce in Congress during his 1964 landslide
election were reduced from 155 to 60 in the House and from 36 to 28 in the Senate. 4
Nonetheless, this small increase in conservative influence in Congress did little to hinder
the overall liberalism in Washington during this period, and even with his attention
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shifted toward the Vietnam War, Johnson was still able to complete the Great Society
agenda, passing several programs in his final years in office.
Despite the backlash against the changes the Great Society had made in domestic
policy Congress remained solidly Democratic, and there is no doubt that a “postwar
liberalism” had established itself in Washington and continued to wield its influence on
federal policy throughout the Johnson administration. Moreover, the mindset of
American citizens towards their government once again shifted further to the left, and so
did their politics during this time period throughout the late 1950’s and 1960’s as a result
of the phenomena.
With the vast changes being made to domestic policy in America, voters garnered
a mentality that encompassed a sense of entitlement from the federal government. Thus,
they began to expected more support and aid in their everyday lives from Washington.
The acuteness of this transition was reminiscent of the shift that FDR’s “New Deal”
ideology had brought on thirty years earlier. Commenting on the political shifts during
this period, Gerald Pomper asserts that this context shaped political distractions in
Washington and writes, “The events and campaigns of the 1960s, I suggest, made politics
more relevant and more dramatic to the mass electorate. In the process, party differences
were developed and perceived. Democrats divided from Republicans, Democrats became
more liberal, and voters became more aware.” 5 With voters becoming more aware of the
liberal political change that was taking place in Washington, they also reawakened to the
sentiments on federal support that the New Deal had generated thirty years earlier, when
this type of liberalism last occurred among the Federal government. Consequently, this
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revived awareness reinforced the sense of entitlement among Americans for aid and
support from the federal government.
In Washington, this period not only push Democrats further left, it also
exacerbated divisions in the Republican Party, pitting supporters of an expanded federal
agenda in domestic affairs against more traditionally conservative Republicans. This
proved to be an important factor in the 1968 elections. Upon beginning his campaign for
president in 1968, Nixon adapted the “southern strategy” to win the presidency. Citing
riots in Detroit and Washington D.C. that arose from the assassination of Martin Luther
King Jr. in April of that year, Nixon promised a return of law and order and promoted
implementing greater civil rights for African-Americans while continuing segregation in
some cases including bussing. 6 Nixon also advocated for New Federalism, which
appealed to southerners who had begun to fear the increased hand in social and economic
matters that the federal government had taken.
With this campaign strategy, Nixon was able to walk a fine line, promoting the
rising conservative sentiment that had recently emerged, while continuing to support
many of Johnson’s federal programs. This secured many votes from conservative white
southerners who had traditionally voted Democrat, but had become frustrated with the
Johnson administration’s domestic reforms and whole-hearted support for the civil rights
movement. However, Nixon knew he must also win the majority of votes in Republican
states, and with conservative and liberal Republicans growing more divided, doing this
became an increasingly more complicated task.
In Richard M. Nixon: Politician, President, Administrator, Friedman and
Levantrosser write, “At the beginning of the 1968 presidential campaign, one of the brash
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young founders of the Ripon Society advised Nixon that the only issues over which
liberal and conservative Republicans might unite were a negative income tax and a
volunteer army. Nonetheless, Nixon managed to become president without having
clarified either issue. Nixon’s views on welfare, in particular, remained highly
unfocused.” 7 During the 1968 election, Nixon did very well to be sensitive of the
intricate political climate the Johnson administration had produced and not alienate any
Republican sect or conservative Democrats whose support he hoped to gain. As such, he
was extremely careful and somewhat ambiguous in his comments on federal expansion in
domestic affairs.
Upon entering office in 1969, Nixon looked to unify an especially partisan
Congress and gain the trust and approval of Democrats throughout the U.S., who had
been disappointed by his election. To do this, he drew on Johnson’s liberal activism to
promote optimism in change and a bright future for America and its people. On January
20, 1969 President Nixon gave his first Inaugural Address. Speaking on the future of the
U.S. he proclaimed:

As we reach toward our hopes, our task is to build on what has gone
before – not turning away from the old, but turning toward the new. In this
past third of a century, government has passed more laws, spent more
money, and initiated more programs, than in all our previous history. In
pursuing our goals of full employment, better housing, excellence in
education; in rebuilding our cities and improving our rural areas; in
protecting our environment and enhancing the quality of life – in all these
and more, we will and must press urgently forward. We shall plan now for
the day when our wealth can be transferred from the destruction of war
abroad to the urgent needs of our people at home. 8
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From the start of his time in power, Nixon made clear that he was more focused on
following a course of action to secure his legacy in U.S. history than yielding to the
influence of those that elected him. Nixon’s stance in office ran perpendicular traditional
Republican sentiment and what he had toted in his election campaign. As Bartlet writes,
“Conservatives were infuriated by Nixon’s betrayal, but lacking control of Congress were
stuck with him”. 9
Joan Hoff, who argues that Nixon was in fact a “closet liberal” on domestic issues
while in office in her book Nixon Reconsidered, draws heavily Nixon’s unanticipated
course of action during his first term as evidence for her thesis. In an excerpt of her
publication she writes:
Few listened when he said in 1969 that he intended “to begin a decade of
government reforms such as this nation has not witnessed in half a
century.” And most of us scoffed when in 1971 his speech writers came up
with the grandiose phrase “the New American Revolution” to describe his
domestic programs. Yet during his first term in office, Nixon acted as an
agent for change in five areas of domestic reform: welfare, civil rights,
economic policy, environmental policy, and reorganization of the federal
bureaucracy. 10
It’s clear that one he had attained the presidency Nixon exhibited no loyalty to those who
had brought him to power, and focused solely on his own political strategy and agenda.
As Hoff contends, Nixon did in fact nearly nothing to clamp down on the Great Society
initiatives Johnson’s administration had established. Furthermore, citing Nixon’s stance
on the environment, Native Americans, and his relations with the Supreme Court, she
asserts that when his more liberal advisors were strongly engaged in these issues, “he
(Nixon) could go beyond the New Deal and the Great Society plans as an agent for
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change”. 11 Nonetheless, Hoff explains that during his first year in office Nixon was
clearly much more interested and invested in foreign affairs and the ongoing war in
Vietnam than restructuring domestic affairs.
Yet in the summer of that year, Nixon’s focus was demanded at home when
Hurricane Camille ravaged the South-Eastern U.S. and wrought one of the most
devastating natural disasters America had ever known. Camille first formed several miles
south of Cuba on August 14, 1969, and continued to grow in strength as it headed North
through Cuba and towards the continental U.S. By August 16, Camille had reached the
intensity of a Category 5 hurricane and the following day, the storm hit shore just east of
Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Over the next 72 hours, Camille ravaged the Gulf Coast,
tearing through Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, West Virginia, and Virginia before
continuing back into the Atlantic Ocean. 12 With winds exceeding 190 mph, on top of a
powerful driving rain, Camille reaped unprecedented destruction throughout the Southern
and East-Central U.S., causing 248 fatalities and leaving behind an estimated 1.5 billion
in damages. Additionally, a report on the hurricane confirmed that seventy-five thousand
families had suffered losses during Camille and over 20,000 homes were heavily
damaged or destroyed in the disaster. 13
The catastrophe that Hurricane Camille presented was immediately picked up by
major newswires and became quickly known across the nation. As such Camille differed
from previous catastrophes as a disaster that was recognized on a national scope, not just
in the affected areas. In an article immediately following the disaster, the Milwaukee
11

Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 49.
“Hurricane Camille – August 16-21, 1969” http://www.hpc.ncep.noaa.gov/tropical/rain/camille1969.html.
13
Senate Committee on Public Works, Special Subcommittee on Disaster Relief, Federal Response to
Hurricane Camille, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., Jan. 7-9, 1970, parts 1,2,3,4, and 5 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1970), 15.
12

28

Journal reporting on Gulfport Mississippi wrote, “In at least two towns, Bay St. Louis,
Miss., and nearby Waveland, fires burned out of control in the downtown area and
threatened to level the business districts.” 14 The article continued on to quote Danny
Guice, the mayor of Gulfport, who claimed “We have at least 10 dead in Biloxi and we
haven’t even begun to check.” 15 In their book on Hurricane Camille, Ernest Zebrowski
and Judith A. Howard write on the destruction following the catastrophe and assert:
As those sad images and reports began to appear in the media, readers and
viewers got the impression that the destruction had been confined to the
beachfront strip along the Mississippi coast. The devastation was much
broader, however, and it extended into places most folks knew nothing
about or, if they did, seldom thought of. When the Mobile District of the
Army Corps of Engineers conducted a study of the inundated areas within
its jurisdiction, it discovered that the massive flood had circled behind the
coastal towns and cities to sow havoc as far as twenty miles inland. 16
The chart shown below, documents the impact of Hurricane Camille in Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Alabama, and more comprehensively shows the scope of its destruction: 17
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Despite their early reluctance to act in cases of major natural catastrophe,
throughout the previous fifteen years, the federal government had taken steps to map out
a blueprint a federal disaster relief plan, complete with task-oriented committees and
departments to utilize for disaster aid. Nonetheless, as was mentioned, both liberal and
conservative presidents alike had shied away from confronting major natural disasters
with federal disaster relief. The costs were extremely high, the logistical workings were
unpolished, and no president had yet succeeded in fully appeasing disaster victims with
their federal relief effort. Overall, adequately investing in federal disaster relief was seen
as too much of a risk for any president to endeavor.
Nonetheless, promptly following the catastrophe, Nixon leapt into action, granting
major disaster declarations in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia and West
Virginia. Within a week, the President had also begun to generate a massive organized
effort within Washington involving over 35 federal departments and agencies. 18 To fund
this program, the President committed $75 million from his disaster to fund to the federal
relief effort and assigned George Lincoln, the head of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness to manage the assistance and correspond with him on its progress.
The Office of Emergency Preparedness was created in 1961, shortly after
President Kennedy took office. According to Peter May, its creation came as a result of a
change of thinking towards the relationships in civil defense and federal disaster
assistance. 19 May writes,
After a review of civil defense activities, the president concluded that civil
defense capabilities needed to be strengthened and that a new
organizational structure was necessary to achieve that goal. The new
structure transferred civil defense operational activities to the Department
18
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of Defense and established in the Executive Office of the President a small
office initially named the Office of Emergency Planning, charged with
coordinating federal civil defense including natural disaster efforts. 20

Facing the destruction and chaos that Hurricane Camille had wrought, Nixon relied
heavily on Lincoln and the OEP to coordinate the relief effort, a massive undertaking, in
order to effectively aid victims and utilize federal resources behind the scenes while he
served as the face of the Federal assistance effort.
In an especially empathetic gesture, on September 8th Nixon flew over the
affected areas in Mississippi and took an areal survey of the damages. In a speech
following his flight in Gulfport Mississippi, Nixon proclaimed to the primarily
Democratic state, “On the part of your Federal Government, I can certainly pledge to you
a continuation of the interest that we have already shown, an interest that is not partisan –
it represents all the people of this country; an interest in terms of all the departments of
Government, all the agencies in Government; an interest which is shared by the Members
of the House and the Senate, led by your own House and Senate delegation.” 21 Nixon’s
message was founded and writing on this in Recovering from Catastrophes May asserts
that the political reality of the nature of disaster relief is that congressmen are compelled
to become involved in the relief activities because it is a clear and direct service to their
constituents. 22 May expands this notion writing:
These realities of politics are such that it is naïve to suggest that politics
can be completely taken out of the formulation of relief packages for
particular disasters or the delivery of relief assistance. The challenge for
those concerned with disaster policy is to design relief programs and
20
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policies that recognize elected officials’ desire to help constituents and
their need to be visible, while minimizing the negative consequences of
such involvement. 23

Moreover, Nixon’s statement not only comforted the victims he was speaking to, but also
secured the greater level of bipartisan support for his federal disaster relief initiatives the
enormity of this catastrophe facilitated.
Nixon’s pledge to exert federal resources as much as necessary in disaster relief
came as an enormous relief to the thousands whose lives had been uprooted by Hurricane
Camille. Despite having plenty of advance notice of Hurricane Camille’s strength and the
ability to track the storm’s progress and movement, it was officially estimated that only
81,000 out of 150,000 in the evacuation area moved themselves to safety. 24 Furthermore
the aftermath of the catastrophe proved that the Gulf Coast was still utterly underprepared
for her arrival. Despite this, promptly after the damage had been surveyed Vice President
Agnew criticized the U.S. Weather Bureau claiming that its’ forecasting for Hurricane
Camille “may have been inadequate.” 25 Nixon legitimized Agnew’s charges capitalized
on the opportunity to take action, directing government agencies to investigate better
methods of forecasting storms such as Hurricane Camille. 26 On August 29 the
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report confirmed this writing, “After a report from
Vice President Spiro T. Agnew on the Gulf Coast disaster, the President was said to have
expressed concern at the inability of Government weather agencies to predict the
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intensity and direction of storms.” 27 Though they did not receive the official criticisms
that the U.S. Weather Bureau did, in retrospect it is clear that those that did not heed the
evacuation warnings are to blame for the huge number of those killed and injured in the
storm.
Nonetheless, the damage had been done and the thousands of disaster victims
Camille had generated presented an overwhelming problem that needed to be dealt with.
In the immediate aftermath of the storm, State and local officials offered their resources,
joining forces with the federal workforce to provide food, shelter, and provisions for
disaster victims. However, relief at the lower local and state level proved to be much for
ineffective than that at the federal level, and more than anything, it only added to the
confusion and chaos of the total relief effort. Simultaneously, on the federal level Nixon
ordered 1450 regular troops and 800 of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to transport
and provide tons of food, vehicles and other supplies to the affected areas in the days
following the disaster. 28 Along with U.S. Army soldiers, Nixon also utilized the Coast
Guard, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to help with search and rescue missions,
evacuations, debris removal and the distribution of food and other supplies to victims.
Overall, the Department of Defense provided 16,500 troops and $34 million to the federal
relief effort. 29
As they had been instructed to do by the President, in the initial days following
Hurricane Camille the OEP also began to implement and coordinate their disaster relief
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programs among different departments of the federal government. 30 The U.S. Department
of Defense, the U.S. Army, the USACOE, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and even the Federal Bureau of Investigation all contributed to
the federal disaster relief effort after Camille. Lincoln quickly organized a network of
federal departments and offices to focus on specialized tasks and services in the recovery
effort. These included the Federal Power Commission, which devoted their engineers to
returning power to the area, the Department of Health, which contributed their services as
well as $4 million towards medial aid for victims, the Department of Commerce, who,
along with the Economic Development Administration and the Small Business
Administration, worked to restore economic conditions in affected areas and reduce
unemployment after the storm, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which provided 5,000 mobile
homes for victims whose homes had been destroyed or badly damaged, and worked to
have the homeless moving into the homes just a week after Camille hit, all worked in
coordination with the OEP in the federal response to Hurricane Camille. 31
Certainly the sheer enormity of the rage of federal agencies involved in the relief
effort for Hurricane Camille conveyed a genuine commitment from the federal
government to match the scope of the catastrophe with their relief effort. Moreover,
Nixon’s actions in the aftermath of the disaster, directing 35 different government
agencies to lend their services to the relief effort, are also consistent with his aim to be
proactive and his desire to be seen as such. However, unforeseen to the architects of this
relief effort, the number of federal agencies involved was also one of the key hindrances

30
31

Federal Response to Hurricane Camille, 15.
Pielke, et al, “Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille”.

34

to its’ effectiveness. In 1999, the authors of a report on Hurricane Camille, which was
sponsored by the NOAA Coastal Services Center, concluded that despite the effort to
enhanced coordination between government agencies, coordination from the top down
was lacking throughout the federal relief effort in the aftermath of Hurricane Camille and
was the source of many of its deficiencies. 32
Additionally, non-government organizations also played a large role in the relief
effort, working closely with state officials following Hurricane Camille. At the forefront
of these NGO’s was the Red Cross, which assisted in setting up and running shelters
designed to provide for up to 85,000 disaster victims. To do so, the Red Cross devoted
850 of its employees and 913 volunteer rescuers to their disaster relief effort. 33 Another
substantial contribution was made by the Salvation Army, which also committed itself to
serving disaster victims by providing them with food and other essentials. A federal
analysis of Hurricane Camille later reported that the total cost of the services rendered by
Salvation Army amounted to $689,000, and the value of the food and supplies furnished
to disaster victims in the aftermath of the disaster exceeded $5,000,000.” 34
These two charities were accompanied by a slew of smaller, local organizations,
and volunteers that also contributed their time, services and skills to the relief effort,
helping to implement and manage these resources. One example of this which received a
particularly large amount of praise, were lawyers in affected areas who volunteered their
services to victims seeking claims and relief from state and federal relief offices
including the SBA and EDA departments and who could otherwise not have afforded
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legal representation. Describing their cause, Boyce Holleman, a spokesman for the
volunteer lawyers stated, “The aim of the project is to provide legal services to hurricane
victims who are poor and would not otherwise receive such aid.” 35
In Category 5, Zebrowski and Howard also comment on local activists and
highlight the story of Jackson Balch, a space center manager in Mississippi for NASA
who became a leading local relief activist in the wake of Hurricane Camille. 36 Five
months after the catastrophe occurred, Balch testified before a U.S. Senate subcommittee
investigating the efficiency of the disaster relief following the Hurricane. After being
recognized thanked for his patience by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, the chair of the
subcommittee, Jackson stated for the record: “Mr. Chairman, I can do one of two things. I
can read a sanitized statement which has been approved for me to read, or I can give you
a picture from being a participant of [my own] experience about what the story is.” 37
Following the sanitized version of Balch’s statement for the record, Bayh asked
for Balch’s true opinion. In response, Balch began by explaining how his work for NASA
had generated an interest in Hurricane Camille for him, and when his home was “nearly
totally destroyed” by the storm he became immersed in the relief effort. Balch then
continued to speak about his experiences as a volunteer worker calling attention to the
disorganization he witnessed and dealt with throughout from the relief effort. He recalled
being given orders to report to a site and then upon arriving being told to go elsewhere by
the National Guard already there. 38

35

Paul Delaney, “Volunteer Lawyers Are Helping Hurricane Victims in Mississippi”, New York Times, Oct
12, 1969, 74.
36
Zebrowski, Howard, Category 5, 146.
37
Federal Response to Hurricane Camille, 379.
38
Federal Response to Hurricane Camille, 395.

36

Balch also testified to the apathy he faced by state and local organizations as a
volunteer worker. Highlighted in their book, Zebrowski and Howard write:
To the embarrassment of some of those present, he told the story of how
Dr. Werner von Braun (a former Nazi who had since worked for NASA
with Balch in Mississippi) had been more responsive than many regional
and state organizations, and he admitted with full candor that he suspected
that his comments were likely to get him into trouble. 39
Overall, Balch’s testimony highlighted the inefficiency that the lack of coordination
between the forces involved—federal, state, local, and volunteer—had created. More
specifically, Balch’s testimony honed in on key criticisms of the state and local relief
effort, including some discrimination and mistreatment he had personally viewed from
the American Red Cross, and framed it as a porous and uninspiring effort.
Nonetheless, victims who sought federal relief services also submitted complaints
directed specifically at the federal government on its shortcomings in the relief effort. At
the top of their list were criticisms of the federal government’s disorganization and lack
of efficiency in the relief effort, and before long, with the help of national media services
and newswires; these criticisms became a national concern. Writing on the frustration and
inconvenience that the disorganization among federal relief departments was causing so
many in the aftermath of the storm, an article in the North Carolina based Times-News
reported, “For four months after Hurricane Camille, Carl Perdue says he was shuttled
from the Small Business Administration (SBA) to the Red Cross and back again
attempting to obtain money for repairs. The 73-year-old Mississippi coast resident said
the SBA finally told his home he was too old for a loan to fix his home and vegetable
business. ‘Why did they take four months to tell me I’m too old? he asked the Senate
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subcommittee on disaster relief Friday. ‘I’m older now than I was when I first asked for
the money.’” 40
Unfortunately, Purdue was not an exception; many of the disaster victims seeking
relief from the federal government had experienced similar problems with
disorganization and inadequacy in the months after the relief effort began while working
with the various federal organizations. However, organizational problems, especially for
HUD and the SBA, were insult to injury that came on top of Camille victims accusing
relief organizations at the federal level, and much more frequently at the state, and nongovernment level of racism in their relief efforts.
Unfortunately, many had experienced racial discrimination when working with
disaster relief organizations. The same article quoting Purdue makes this evident
reporting, “His testimony came on the final day of the three-day hearing filled with
charges that disaster relief agencies discriminated against blacks and the poor in
dispensing aid after the Aug. 17 Hurricane.” 41 On November 24, the American Friends
Service Committee and the Southern Regional Council, two private organizations,
published one of the first public reports on the racial discrimination present in disaster
relief effort for Hurricane Camille. Quoting a statement by these two organizations, New
York Times records, “Federal officials have taken little or no action to combat racial
discrimination in Mississippi in this disaster, and in some significant instances have
contributed to the problem.” 42
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Months later, in a congressional hearing on the federal relief effort for Hurricane
Camille, both the SBA and HUD were accused of administering relief “in a
discriminatory manner”. 43 Citing the findings by the American Friends Service
Committee and the Southern Regional Council, the hearing quotes their report stating, “In
the month following the hurricane (September) SBA approved 617 disaster loans. All but
21 (3%) went to whites. In addition, the average white loan was $8,919 and the average
black loan was $3797. Finally, 99% of the total dollars in loans approved by SBA have
been for whites.” 44 Speaking on the discrimination found in HUD relief, the document
states, “The federal fair housing statute states that ‘all executive departments and
agencies shall administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban
development in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of the law.’ HUD has
principal responsibility for administering this act for its own activities and for other
agencies. It has taken virtually no action under this language since its passage. This will
directly affect the future development of the Gulf Coast.” 45 Yet despite the claims and
citations on discrimination that occurred in the federal relief effort, criticisms of
discrimination in federal aid were significantly less widespread than those of racial
discrimination in the state and NGO’s relief effort. In particular, the Red Cross was
repeatedly accused of racism and giving priority treatment to white victims over black
ones; an issue that became infamous in the relief period after Camille once it came to
light.
Dr. Gilbert Mason, a Biloxi Mississippi physician and the president of the local
chapter of the NAACP, had been involved in the Civil Rights Movement since the late
43
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1950’s. He had already registered several complaints with the state and local government
in Mississippi for racial discrimination prior to Hurricane Camille, and throughout the
relief effort served as the leading voice of criticism towards the racial discrimination that,
as he saw it, was inherent in the state and local relief effort. Mason particularly focused
on the wrongdoings of the American Red Cross (ARC), who extended their aid
extensively, throughout numerous various relief efforts. After being denied at an ARC
clothing distribution center on the basis that, “if he was indeed a doctor, then he didn’t
need any help,” Mason declared, “Red Cross workers in Biloxi developed a reputation for
needlessly humiliating those seeking relief, especially black folks, whom they often
seemed to make beg cajole, or grovel for assistance.” 46
Zebrowski and Howard assert that while he was one of the most outspoken critics
of the outrageous racism that the Red Cross exhibited, Mason was not alone. They write,
“After Camille, however, numerous survivors testified that they were grossly displeased
by the performance of the Red Cross.” 47 Following the relief effort, Mason testified to
Birch Bayh and the Special Subcommittee on Disaster Relief, the same congressional
subcommittee that Jack Balch had testified before. In his testimony, Mason made sure to
make his criticisms of the Red Cross as pointed as possible and stated, “Held out to be the
official reclamation agency, historically held out to be the ‘Good Samaritan,’ cloaked in
the deluding, scintillating raiments of golden, brotherly love, ensconced in the arms of a
national charter, the American Red Cross, as it has operated on the Gulf Coast and
certainly in Biloxi, has betrayed its trust”. 48 In another Senate subcommittee hearing,
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specifically aimed at investigating Hurricane Camille relief operations, and formed in
response to the American Friends Service Committee and the Southern Regional
Council’s reports, Mason further denounced the Red Cross describing it as, “The most
dehumanizing, denigrating, humiliating and bureaucratic demon to appear on the Gulf
Coast after Camille is the American Red Cross”. 49 Mason also claimed discrimination in
the state of Mississippi’s relief efforts, specifically citing that blacks were being excluded
in the state’s redevelopment efforts.
Though his statements reflected his pessimism that any type of fair resolution or
retribution would be repaid to black victims, Mason’s complaints were not entirely in
vain. Mark Smith asserts, “Thanks to the efforts of Mason, state NAACP president Aaron
Henry, the CCODC, and Robert Clark – the only black representative in the state
legislature and Chairman of the CCODC – Mason, and a handful of other African
Americans, were given a voice on Governor John Bell Williams’s formerly all white
Hurricane Emergency Relief Council.” Nonetheless, Smith concedes, “But these
additions to the Council were not made until January 1970, and the bulk of the
emergency relief still went to business. 50
Following Hurricane Camille, Birch Bayh and Quentin Burdick, specialists in
disaster relief policy in Washington, and dedicated their focus to documenting the
problems that arose in the relief effort following Camille and using these criticisms to
improve disaster relief policy. Their passion for creating effective federal disaster relief
legislation precipitated the intensive hearings and both Jack Balch and Gilbert Mason
testified in following the catastrophe. In large part, these hearings served to shed light on
49
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the vast inefficiencies and discrimination that was present and exhibited in the state and
local relief efforts, but these criticisms were also taken into consideration for federal
disaster relief policy, and thus were quintessential to its’ evolution in these years.
Crediting these two senators’ influence in disaster relief legislation May writes:
Bayh and later Burdick, had considerable success in securing passage of
these (disaster relief) bills in part because they were able to accommodate
many of the demands they heard during their disaster relief hearings.
Typically such hearings consisted of various local officials’ berating the
governmental relief effort for the disaster that was being investigated
along with demands for new relief provisions as part of the general relief
act. 51
Additionally, consistent with his claim that major disasters serve as the primary
catalyst for the expansion of disaster relief programs, May asserts that these
hearings also highlighted the expanded sense of entitlement that disaster victims
felt towards many aspects of federal disaster relief. In turn, May concludes, “Over
time, each of these aspects of the general relief act were expanded considerably,
evidencing the changing congressional attitude about what constitutes and
appropriate level of disaster relief.” 52
These effects were certainly represented in the legislation towards disaster relief
that was generated during this period. Following California mudslides in May of 1969,
the President and Congress approved the Disaster Relief Act of 1969. A provisional
expansion of the 1966 legislation, the 1969 Act required that the federal government
match state funds for disaster relief, and that a Federal coordinating officer be appointed
for each major disaster. 53 In addition to these new amendments, the Disaster Relief Act of
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1969 also implemented temporary provisions to disaster relief that were to be terminated
on December 31, 1970, unless they were permanently passed into law prior to the date.
These provisions included 50-50 funding of permanent highway construction between the
state and Federal government, timber sales contracts and damaged timber removal by the
Federal government, larger SBA and FHA loans, and more funding and support in
temporary housing food coupons, disaster unemployment compensation, and debris
removal from private property. 54
When the 1969 Annual Report on Disaster Relief was published, it reported that
in keeping with the amendments of the Disaster Relief Act of 1969, President Nixon had
invested a huge amount of the Federal government’s funding and resources into federal
disaster assistance in 1969, especially after Hurricane Camille. The OEP reported that in
1969, Hurricane Camille alone precipitated five natural disaster declarations from the
President in five different areas, mostly from flooding. The OEP asserted that in these
crises disaster relief funds comprised only a fraction of the aid provided; the SBA and
Farmers Home Administration (FHA) had subsidized this funding with major assistance
in 1969 to homeowners, businessmen, and farmers. Additionally, the Department of
Agriculture had contributed food to disaster victims; the Department of Justice had
played a large role in facilitating Community Relations, and the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) provided legal assistance grants for victims. The OEP also pointed
out that in 1968, $20 million was requested for disaster relief in 1970, but due to the
recovery effort for Hurricane Camille, that number increased tremendously in later
amendments and already $170 million had been appropriated for 1970. 55
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Citing the 1969 Annual Report on Disaster Relief, the report disclosed that in the
wake of Hurricane Camille, public and private property losses were estimated at $1.5
billion. In response to this, the President had allocated just $12 million, a relative drop in
the bucket, from his disaster fund to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to remove
850,000 tons of debris from private property. By December 31, 1969 $13,570,000 had
been allocated from the President’s Disaster Fund and the total cost federal aid was
estimated to be at $90 million. 56
Following these first relief initiatives, in 1970 Birch Bayh and the Senate Special
Subcommittee on Disaster Relief of the Committee of Public Works began their hearings
assessing the relief effort following Hurricane Camille. Despite the aforementioned
criticisms that federal relief had in some cases been discriminatory, Nixon and the OEP
received a generally positive response from congressmen and state officials of the
affected areas, who came to voice their opinions. Among those who complimented the
President’s efforts was Robert Dole, a U.S. Senator from Kansas and a minority member
of the Special Subcommittee who claimed, “On September 8, President Nixon visited
Mississippi to express his concern for the people affected by Camille. I can tell you very
candidly that the President is deeply interested in the subject of these hearings and
particularly the effectiveness of our disaster relief.” 57
Though the Republican Senator’s comments may have been a partisan defense of
Nixon’s initiatives, Rep. William Colmer, a conservative Democrat whose district had
been hit by Camille and who was representing the state of Mississippi in this hearing,
also voiced his approval stating to the Congress, “I would have to say that, in general I
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have been pleased with the cooperation that we have received from all the agencies of the
Federal Government and from the President himself who has been very much interested
in this matter.” 58 Nonetheless, those present at the hearing stressed that more organization
and coordination between federal department was necessary to better aid those who were
still suffering from Hurricane Camille and for natural disasters in the future.
As such, three months after hearings on the Federal response to Hurricane
Camille had concluded, President Nixon spoke to Congress on Federal Disaster
Assistance. In his message, Nixon stated, “To extend and to improve the assistance,
which the Federal Government can provide in times of major disasters, I am asking the
Congress to enact the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970.” 59 Additionally, Nixon made a
number of specific proposals for the extension of existing programs to be considered in
the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970, the most important of which included a property tax
revenue maintenance plan, permanent repair of public facilities damaged by disasters,
staff support, technical advice and financial assistance by the Economic Development
Administration for affected communities, improved disaster loan programs, an expansion
of unemployment compensation for disaster victims, an improvement of the temporary
housing program, speedier debris removal, Federal assistance with disaster prevention,
and Federal disaster planning assistance for State governments. 60
In addition to these considerations, Nixon also encouraged improving several
administrative actions including, better coordination between the offices involved in
federal disaster assistance efforts, better communication to individuals as to what disaster
58
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assistance was available and where it could be found, better institution of a Federal
Disaster Assistance Coordinator who would oversee teams to help local communities
coordinate the overall assistance effort, an expanded Federal disaster insurance program,
and a closer relationship between the Federal government’s disaster assistance and civil
defense activities. 61
Simply put, the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970 served as a revision for the
Disaster Relief Act of 1969, which outlined the legislation for any federal disaster
assistance that was enacted, and more importantly, made the provisions new to the 1969
act a more permanent part of the disaster relief program. In large part, the revision was
shaped from the problems that arose in the relief effort after Hurricane Camille.
Reinforcing Nixon’s prerogative, the OEP’s Annual Disaster Relief Report for 1969
conveyed the same concerns and aims as Nixon had for the continued assistance in the
wake of Hurricane Camille, and the future of federal disaster relief.
A chief criticism of the federal response to Camille was that while the Disaster
Relief Act of 1969 was passed prior to Hurricane Camille, many victims were not able to
take advantage of the expanded provisions that the new legislation provided them
because of the time it took for the President to sign and implement the legislation. A
statement by Senator Bob Dole in January of 1970, highlighted this concern and claims:
The new Disaster Relief Act of 1969, signed by the President on October 1
added new types of assistance, which had to be programmed into relief
efforts. Unfortunately, this took time and generated frustration and
continued hardship for Camille victims. Of course, there will always be
problems in the administration of disaster relief, because by definition a
disaster involves losses and unusual hardship, not all of which is either
predictable or restorable. Recompense can never be made for the suffering
and shock of sudden calamity. Despite this face, however, it is our
responsibility to make Federal programs more responsive to people’s
61
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needs. We must continue to seek better legislative solution and upgrade
our administrative procedures. During emergencies red tape and delay in
action should never be allowed to compound existing hardship. 62
The OEP reported that among those beneficial provisions, were matching funds
to state planning and coordinating aid for State and local victims and appointing a Federal
Coordinating Officer for each major disaster. The OEP also pointed out those several
provisions of the Disaster Relief Act of 1969 that were to be terminated on December 31,
1970, including 50-50 federal-state funding of permanent highway reconstruction,
Federal timber sales contracts, damaged timber removal, larger SBA and FHA loans, and
several other provisions concerning temporary housing, food coupons, disaster
unemployment compensation, and debris removal from private property. 63 The Disaster
Assistance Act of 1970 would make many of these temporary provisions permanent, and
in doing so, get through the “red tape” that hindered the process of implementing new
amendments to the disaster act before the next disaster struck.
Three months after both President Nixon and the executives of the OEP outlined
their proposals for the improved Disaster Assistance Act of 1970, the Subcommittee on
Flood Control of the Congressional Committee on Public Works met from July 28-30 for
hearings on Disaster Assistance Legislation for 1970. The primary proposal being
discussed at these hearings was H.R. 1758, a bill proposed by Congressman George
Fallon of Maryland comprising of several amendments, “to amend existing Federal
disaster assistance legislation, and for other purposes”. 64
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In his statement to the Subcommittee, George Lincoln, the director of the OEP
endorsed H.R. 17518 as well. Lincoln also commented, “Generally, I believe new
legislation should grant broad and flexible authority to the President and any changes
should be limited to those points which have not worked well in the past. The position of
OEP is that H.R. 17518 adequately meets this objective.” 65 Lincoln’s endorsement of
H.R. 17518 was founded on his conservative idea of what the federal role should be in
disaster relief. His testimony conveys that he was wary of too much expansion for the
federal disaster relief program, a belief that contested many Democrats’ vision of the
future of the federal role in disaster relief. Stating his belief on this issue in the hearing,
Lincoln proclaimed, “In responding to these ravages, the States and their local
governments must and do, assume the primary responsibilities for any successful disaster
relief effort. Private humanitarian agencies have always come to the forefront in times of
disaster. The Federal role is a supplementary effort but an exceedingly important one
when the resources and capabilities of the State, local, and private organizations and
individuals are unable to cope with the suffering, hardships, and losses.” 66
All in attendance shared Lincoln’s sentiment on the new amendment. H.R. 17518
stood up to questioning by John Eachon Jr., of the SBA, Jim Proctor, Associate General
Council, and Bryan Shoemaker of the Office of Disaster Relief, and pleased the specific
concerns brought to light by each. After their questions on past deficiencies with SBA
loan regulations for disaster victims had been answered, the three jointly endorsed the
bill, which lowered the interest rate for disaster loans and introduced $2,500 forgiveness
on disaster loans stating, “We urge favorable consideration of the administration bill,
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H.R. 17518 and H.R 17824, which extends and improves upon the provision of the
Disaster Relief Act of 1969, and of the SBA disaster program in general.” 67
H.R. 17518 also impressed Norman Watson of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) and Kenneth Cavanaugh, Chairman of the HUD Task Force
on Disaster Housing, who wanted more organization in the temporary housing program
and the ability to effectively expand temporary housing aid if need be. Despite some
minor concerns on the rent program for temporary housing and housing availability for
disaster relief volunteers to travel to the affected areas, Watson submitted a positive
recommendation to the Subcommittee. In his final statement to the Subcommittee,
Watson urged favorable action on the bill. Specifically, Watson citied the provisions that
specifically affected HUD and claimed, “(the bill) would improve upon the provisions in
existing law directed toward temporary emergency housing by amending the provisions
for temporary housing in the basic federal disaster assistance statute…It would do so
however, in a way that assures necessary administrative flexibility.” 68
Similarly, representatives of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, major
government contractors, the Salvation Army, the Economic Development
Administration, the American National Red Cross and the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, while stressing the need for added funding in disaster relief, each
stated their support for H.R. 17518 and its supplemental amendments including H.R.
17824, introduced by George H.W. Bush of Texas, to improve the Disaster Relief Act of
1969 and implement the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970.
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Nixon too, was pleased with Congress’s legislation and upon signing the bill on
December 31, 1970, he released a public statement conveying his approval for the action
Congress had taken to produce S. 3619, the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970. Nixon
stated that while they had adjusted the particulars of his proposals, Congress had acted
boldly and responded to all of his requests and incorporated all of the necessary features
of an effective disaster relief program in their bill. Nixon ended his statement claiming, “I
am pleased with this bill which responds to a vital need of the American people. The bill
demonstrates that the Federal Government in cooperation with State and local authorities
is capable of providing compassionate assistance to the innocent victims of natural
disasters.” 69
The Disaster Assistance Act of 1970 served as more than just a revision of
previous disaster relief legislation. It marked a change it the structure and design of
federal aid. In his essay entitled “Hurricane Camille and the Politics of Federal Disaster
Relief, 1965-1970”, Andrew Morris writes on the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970
asserting, “Most significantly, it considerably widened the scope of federal assistance to
individual disaster victims, moving beyond the longstanding federal role in
reconstruction of public facilities.” 70 This evolution in federal disaster relief from simply
funding the reconstruction of public facilities, and designating all other intricacies of
relief assistance for victims to state and local government, as well as the individuals
themselves, at its foundation certainly can be attributed to the immense destruction
afflicted by Hurricane Camille and the enormous scope of the catastrophe. In total, 8931
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people were left injured, 13,915 homes experience major damage and 5,662 homes were
destroyed all together. This was all on top of the $1.42 billion in damage Camille
precipitated. Looking at these numbers, it is obvious that a greater power than the
individual states affected would be needed to adequately remedy the destruction and
suffering in the Bay Area. Moreover, enthusiasts of the federal disaster relief program
like Birch Bayh and Quentin Burdick were successful in using the bipartisanship present
after Hurricane Camille and the expansive scope of the disaster to pass a similarly
expansive revision to what was the current disaster relief legislation.
Nixon’s initiative to heavily invest in federal disaster relief after Hurricane
Camille proved beneficial to his administration’s standing within Washington. The
President not only took advantage of the opportunity to promote himself as a man of
action, but he also received immediate bipartisan support for the prerogative. This not
only garnered more respect and weight in his proposals for Nixon, but also improved the
legislative production efficiency in Washington, exemplified by the expansive revision of
the Disaster Relief Act of 1969, as “everybody was on board” so to speak. However,
despite a high amount of motivation to implement effective federal disaster relief and the
cooperation among those in power to do so, the overall disorganization and the
complaints against individual departments of the federal relief effort marred what had
been ideally envisioned in Washington.
Nonetheless, criticisms of the federal government in the disaster relief effort
following Hurricane Camille dwarfed in comparison to the well-publicized charges of
racial discrimination brought against the state and local organizations, especially
including the Red Cross, by Gilford Mason, Jack Balch, and others. Given the offensive
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content and the extent of the racial discrimination charges, despite their inadequacies, the
federal government escaped the brunt of widespread public criticism by victims and the
media during and following the aftermath of Hurricane Camille. Nonetheless, individuals
did testify to the deficiencies in the federal program in the congressional hearings
following Camille and these criticisms, along with those against the state and local relief
efforts, combined to prompt the expansion of the federal disaster relief program after
Camille that the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970 represented. The rational being that it
was done in order become more properly suited to deal with the next major disaster to
strike the U.S.
Finally, we must also note that with the harsh criticisms against state and
local organizations brought to light by the media as well as Bayh’s hearings, the
federal government came out of Camille looking like the most reputable and relief
agency in the disaster relief effort. In turn, the U.S. public began to look more
immediate towards Washington to fully invest themselves in future disasters. The
federal relief effort following Hurricane Camille undoubtedly marked an
exceptional effort by the federal government to remedy an extraordinary situation.
However, an article for New York Times on their action by Jason Nathan, who had
just left his position as a City Housing and Development Administrator,
represented the growing sense of entitlement that the U.S. held towards federal
aid, and the expanding scope of what that encompassed. Honing in on the housing
crisis Camille had precipitated, Nathan was asked for his commentary on the
housing crisis in disaster areas. On this, Nathan claimed, “Crisis is an
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understatement’…Disaster may be more appropriate.’” 71 When asked further
about his comments on the federal response to the housing crisis Nathan
commented:
“When a Hurricane Camille strikes and leaves 4,000 or 5,000 families
without homes, the nation’s attention is galvanized. The Federal
Government responds with crisis aid, declaration of emergency are issued,
the National Guard is thrown into action. The calamity called forth
emergency responses of all sorts. Yet in our cities a thousand times that
number of families are ill-housed, virtually homeless. But because they are
the victims of a slow, creeping process rather than a sudden catastrophe,
we as a nation are neither excited nor galvanized into action, even though
the emergency, the crisis, the disaster is more real than 10 Camilles.” 72

Not only had Nixon indicated his administration’s willingness to indulge the
entitlement sentiments that postwar liberalism had regenerated with expanded federal
intervention in domestic affairs, but the comparative incompetency of the state and local
governments, as well as non-profit organizations like the ARC signified the future need
for the federal government to fully intervene in disaster relief in the future. The message
coming out of the relief effort for Hurricane Camille was that was while no player was
great, the federal government at least were more trustworthy and reliable than the
discriminatory state government and non-profits like the Red Cross. Ultimately this
served to raise the stakes for the federal and administrative efforts in future catastrophes.
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Chapter 3
Following the hearings establishing the legislation for the Disaster Assistance Act
of 1970, Nixon’s complete focus turned towards the 1970 U.S. Senate midterm elections
and the President once again utilized the “southern strategy” to campaign for Republican
candidates. Notably, the Nixon administration abruptly dropped their bipartisan sentiment
that had characterized the legislative aftermath of the Hurricane Camille disaster relief
effort, and completely aligned themselves with their conservative constituents. As such,
Nixon, along with Vice President Spiro Agnew, began vigorously campaigning for
Republican votes across the country.
As an announcer commenting on the partisanship that the election had
precipitated claimed, “Both Vice President Agnew and the President campaigned
vigorously for Republican candidates. Nixon spoke to the silent majority and asked them
to show their displeasure with violent dissenters by voting the Republican ticket on
election day.” 1 Following his comments, the announcer highlighted part of the speech by
Nixon to Republican supporters. In it Nixon proclaimed:
The most powerful four letter word is a clean word, it’s the most powerful
four letter word in the history of men, it’s called vote. V-O-T-E. My
friends, I say that the answer to those that engage in disruption, to those
that shout their filthy slogans, to those that try to shoot down speakers, it’s
not to answer in kind, but to go to the polls in election day, and in the
quiet of that ballot box, stand up and be counted, the great silent majority
of America. 2
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Nixon’s rhetoric escalated when the President directly attacked Democrats in Congress
for supporting this type of “radical-liberalism” that those involved in the anti-war
movements showcased. In an 1970 article covering the election, New York Times writes,
“Lawrence F. O’Brien, the Democratic National Chairman, charged, ‘The Republicans
have found a new low in campaign activities and campaign tactics spearheaded by Mr.
Agnew.’ He said that the Vice President had been ‘totally under the guidance and
direction of President Nixon, that every word phrase and sentence he’s uttered has been
orchestrated from the White House.’” 3 Political rhetoric just like this alienated the Nixon
administration from Democrats in Washington and led the President to take a hardened
conservative stance and become less accommodating of liberal ideology towards
domestic policy than he previously had.
In their publication on the 1970 midterm elections, Andrew King and Floyd
Anderson also explore the partisanship and alienation the Nixon administration
demonstrated against liberals while campaigning and write:
Nixon used the interest generated by the battering of his motorcade to
deliver a strong endorsement for Republican tickets across the country.
‘[W]hat we need,’ he said, ‘are men in the House and the Senate of the
United States who…work and talk and vote for those measures that are
necessary to stop the criminal element all year round.’ Then, implying that
Democratic candidates did not so ‘work and talk and vote,’ Nixon added:
‘I urge you to vote for those men who would stand with the President
rather than against the President.’ 4

Both Nixon and Agnew’s aggressive criticisms of the left were well covered and
denounced by Democratic spokesmen and representatives, alienating the Nixon
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administration from the Democratic party and precipitating a strong partisan sentiment
between Republicans and Democrats in Washington. On November 1, 1970, A New York
Times article reported on the previous day’s campaign happenings writing, “Three
Democratic party leaders snapped at President Nixon and Vice President Agnew today
with a combination of fiery accusation, solemn statement and Halloween humor.” 5 The
article continued on to quote Lawrence F. O’Brian, the Democratic National Chairman,
who stated, ‘“The Republicans have found a new low in campaign activities and
campaign tactics, spearheaded by Mr. Agnew.’” 6
The combativeness that ensued between Democrats and Republicans in the 1970
midterm election stuck with Nixon throughout the rest of his time in office. For Nixon,
the partisan tension that escalated leading up to the 1970 Senate elections not only
conveyed that Democrats in Washington supported the anti-war protests and studentcreated “New Left” movement, but more importantly, that the Democratic party was
looking for a reason to criticize Nixon’s job as president and his administration. In Nixon
Reconsidered, Joan Hoff writes that following the 1970 elections, “Nixon continued his
‘war’ against Capitol Hill in the spring of 1971 by deciding it was time to ‘break the back
of the establishment and Democratic leadership…[and] then build a strong defense in
[our] second term.” 7
The aforementioned development would become a crucial factor in aftermath of
Hurricane Agnes when Nixon was once again confronted with a massive natural
catastrophe to provide relief for and a revision of federal disaster relief legislation would
once again be needed. Following the Hurricane Camille catastrophe in 1969, there was a
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bipartisan support for Nixon and his initiatives for federal disaster relief. However,
following Nixon’s actions in the 1970 midterm elections, and his response to anti-war
protests in Washington, Democrats in Congress became distrusting of the Nixon
administration and became more critical of the legislation it proposed to them demanding
changes and compromises in the proposals before endorsing them. Similarly, Nixon
looked for ways to gain discretionary power that would supersede congressional approval
so that they could not hinder his ability to lead swiftly and proactively. This shift in
cooperation and trust between the Nixon administration and Democrats in Congress is
important to keep in mind, as in June of 1972 Nixon once again faced a natural
catastrophe that forced him to appeal to Democrats in Congress for bipartisan support.
Just as Hurricane Camille had, Hurricane Agnes approached the U.S. from the
South, passing just west of Cuba on June 17, 1972. Two days later on June 19, Hurricane
Agnes hit the U.S. coast near Panama City Florida. Upon entering the country the storm
weakened to a tropical depression while traveling north through Georgia. However,
Agnes re-strengthened to become a tropical storm by the time it had reached South
Carolina on June 21, and inflicted damage, especially from flooding, in both South and
North Carolina. Following her destruction on the southeastern coast, Agnes disappeared
into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of North Carolina before reemerging near New York
City on June 22. The storm then followed a westward arc over southern New York into
Northern Pennsylvania where it settled on June 23. 8 Following its second collision with
the U.S. mainland, Hurricane Agnes devastated New York and Pennsylvania over the
next four days with heavy rains and wind that caused immense flooding in the region.
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At the time, Hurricane Agnes had become the most costly storm in U.S. history.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Agnes, the General Adjustment Bureau and the Federal
Insurance Administration calculated that the total flood damage Agnes had inflicted upon
U.S. towns and cities from June 15-27 exceeded $3 billion.9 That damage was coupled
with 128 fatalities that were directly connected to the storm. Though 12 U.S. states
claimed damages by the disaster including, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, West
Virginia, Ohio and Delaware, along with the aforementioned states, ultimately compiling
a collective total of $3,102,571,380, no other state came close in either damages or deaths
caused by the storm than Pennsylvania, which incurred $2,119,269,000 in damages and
48 deaths. 10
In Pennsylvania alone, the hardest hit state, Agnes had reaped nearly $1 billion in
damage. Though only categorized as a tropical storm by the time it hit Pennsylvania,
Agnes flooded the state and its major cities including Wilkes-Barre and Harrisburg to an
unprecedented degree. Commenting on this, historian James Miskel explains, that Agnes
dropped enough rain to create flood that exceeded the ‘one-hundred-year-flood’ levels in
some areas. This meant that the flood waters from Agnes were greater than the level of
the worst flood experts had predicted might occur over a one hundred year span, or that
had actually occurred within the past one hundred years. 11
On July 3, Beaver County Times out of Beaver, Pennsylvania, published that the
American National Red Cross reported that an estimated 63,000 homes in Pennsylvania
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were damaged or destroyed by flooding from Hurricane Agnes. 12 That number was in
large part comprised by damages in the city of Wilkes-Barre in the Wyoming Valley, the
worst affected area in the state. On June 28, 1972, New York Times reported that the
devastating effects of Hurricane Agnes led to a 1.13% dip in the Dow Jones market and a
new 1972 low for American Telephone Company stock. 13 In August, The Palm Beach
Post reported that every single restaurant in Wilkes-Barre Pennsylvania was still closed
more than a month after Hurricane Agnes flooded the entire city in June. The article
alluded that this did little to comfort 1,200 Wilkes-Barre residents who were still sleeping
in churches and schools after their homes were destroyed by the storm. 14
Like hundreds of news publications across the country, Beaver County Time and
The Palm Beach Post relied on national newswires including the United Press
International (UPI) to report on the destruction caused by Hurricane Agnes in
Pennsylvania and throughout the East coast. Just as had been the case during the period
following Hurricane Camille, utilizing UPI and other newswires ensured that citizens
across the U.S. gained an awareness of the destruction caused by Hurricane Agnes, and in
turn, that fostered a national compassion for disaster victims and residents of the affected
areas. Combined with the nation-wide financial consequences Agnes induced, as New
York Times had reported, Hurricane Agnes had solicited a national scale of impact that
had never before been felt by a natural disaster. The destruction was cataclysmic, and as
soon as the rains stopped it was clear that local resources could not mend the damages
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this catastrophe had caused alone; victims immediately looked to the state and federal
government for support.
The first step for state and federal workers was to survey the damages in
Pennsylvania and other affected areas in order to form a more accurate picture of these
regions’ condition after the storm. After surveying the damage in Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, Richard Sanderson, a senior member of Nixon’s OEP compared the city’s
flooding, “to the effect that would have been achieved if the Mississippi River had been
forcibly rerouted through a tributary of the Susquehanna.” 15 Furthermore, in an account
by Pennsylvania Congressman Dan Flood who met with two surveyors, he states:
Two men walked in and stated to me that they were from Washington and
would begin a survey of the Wyoming Valley to determine temporary
housing needs. These were experienced personnel. They had seen disaster
before. I did not see them for three days, and when they returned, covered
with mud from head to toe, they were in a complete state of shock. The
shock which I saw in their eyes was as great as that of the victims
themselves. Granted Agnes was unprecedented; however, this reaction
was characteristic of many of those whose mission it was to provide
assistance. 16

The immensity of the destruction was immediately clear to Nixon, and forced him
to act quickly to procure enough funding for the massive relief effort it would take to
properly aid victims and repair the affected areas. Thus as Congressional Quarterly
reported, “President Nixon June 27 asked Congress to provide an additional $100-million
to supplement the $18-million left in the fiscal 1972 disaster relief fund and the requested
$92.5-million for fiscal budget of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.” 17
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As Peter May asserts, “A study of the local Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, election
that followed Hurricane Agnes shows that local elected officials did not fulfill citizen
expectations, but there was no retribution at the ballot box.” 18 Despite this, the 1972
election undoubtedly played a large part in Nixon’s strong effort to project himself over
Congress as the face of everything right with the federal government’s relief support.
However, given his frustration with the liberals in Washington at this time, his motivation
to invest so heavily in the Agnes relief effort also stemmed from the public’s expectation
that their government would extend its funding and support towards domestic affairs on a
higher scale than it had ever had before.
Accordingly, upon learning of the immense destruction to Pennsylvania Nixon
advisors saw an opportunity for the President to bolster himself with the same bipartisan
support from Congress his relief actions had received in the wake of Hurricane Camille.
In his biography of Pennsylvania congressman Dan Flood, William Kashatus writes:
John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s chief domestic policy adviser, urged the
president to take a very generous and humanistic approach toward the
Agnes victims. By doing so, Nixon, a Republican, would improve his
standing in a heavily Democratic state in his bid for reelection. It would be
a clever way to “out-McGovern” Senator George McGovern, his liberal
Democratic challenger from South Dakota. Nixon seized the moment and
offered and extremely liberal recovery package. ‘Confronted with so
massive a disaster emergency, our response as a nation must also be
massive,’ he reasoned. ‘Conscience commands it; humanity impels it.’ 19

Nixon also looked to utilize the massive national scope of Hurricane Agnes to his
advantage by casting the Hurricane as a catastrophe that had affected all Americans either
directly or indirectly, and as such, would require a federal relief effort of a similar
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national scope. As a result of this, on July 17, 1972, President Nixon addressed Congress
in a message presenting Hurricane Agnes as a national disaster and proposing additional
disaster relief measures following the catastrophe. Beginning his speech, Nixon stated:
Tropical Storm Agnes has caused unparalleled destruction in many areas
of the eastern United States. More than 128,000 homes and businesses
have been damaged or destroyed, and whole communities have been dealt
a heavy blow. The losses to so many individuals cannot be measured only
in terms of destruction of property and belongings; they must also be
counted in terms of loss of jobs, disruption of families, personal privation,
and anxiety about the future. In the whole history of our Nation, we have
not before encountered such massive destruction over so wide-spread an
area as a result of natural disaster. 20
Nixon continued to proclaim that due to the enormity of the catastrophe, even the
recently amended 1970 Disaster Relief Act was inadequate to deal with this situation and
an expansion of federal disaster relief legislation was needed to cope with the
extraordinary circumstances. The President first proposed the Agnes Recovery Act of
1972 to which he remarked, “This measure deals with disaster loans for homeowners,
farmers and businessmen.” 21 The Agnes Recovery Act of 1972 proposed special
legislation that would raise the amount of principal which could be cancelled or forgiven
from the current $2,500 to $5,000 on loans made by the SBA or Farmers Home
Administration. Additionally, it would also make this forgiveness feature applicable to
the first dollar of a loan rather that after the repayment of the first $500 and the lower the
interest rate to 1% from the current 5 1/8%. 22 Following his proposal Nixon stated, “I call

20

Richard Nixon: "Message to the Congress Proposing Additional Disaster Relief Measures Following
Tropical Storm Agnes," July 17, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3498.
21
Ibid
22
Ibid

62

on the Congress to respond to this emergency by acting on the Agnes Recovery Act so
that it can become law within one week.” 23
Following his proposal for the Agnes Recovery Act of 1972, Nixon continued his
speech, proposing a second recommendation for supplemental appropriations totaling
$1,569,800,000 for the immense emergency, the largest single request of its kind in U.S.
history. 24 Nixon explained that the majority of this money would be allocated to disaster
loans for victims with $1.3 billion going to the SBA and $1.8 million going to the FHA.
The President also called for a supplemental request for an additional $200 million for his
disaster relief fund, “to speed repair and reconstruction of public facilities and to provide
temporary housing, food and unemployment compensation;” $40 million for the
Economic Development Administration, $16 million for the Appalachian Regional
Commission and $12 million for the Corps of Engineers. 25 He then stated his third and
final request that the existing authorization for appropriations for highway emergency
relief be increased by $200 million stating that the current authorization of $50 million
was nowhere near enough to deal with this type of catastrophe. 26 Nixon ended his speech
by urging that Congress act quickly on his proposals stating, “The Federal Government
must act quickly and decisively to do its part in providing relief and aiding recovery in a
cooperative effort with the states and communities struck by Agnes. We can do no less. I
am confident that the Congress will share this view.” 27
Nixon’s message to Congress in the wake of Hurricane Agnes conveyed that the
President expected bipartisan support and cooperation for his disaster relief initiatives, as
23
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had been the case after Hurricane Camille. However, the fierce partisanship that had
emerged leading up to the 1970 midterm elections, and Nixon’s ever-growing hostility
towards the radical leftist movements and anti-war protestors had certainly not gone
unnoticed in Washington. Though only a few Democrats stood in support of the radical
left movements, Nixon’s rhetoric and stance again all leftists had alienated his
administration from Democrats in Congress. Thus, it became the case where independent
of their feelings on his legislation, these Senators and House Representatives had become
uneasy and distrusted the President’s leadership.
Three days after Nixon presented his message to Congress, the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, a bipartisan group, met to discuss the President’s legislative
propositions. Beginning the hearing, Wright Patman, a Democrat from Texas who served
as the chairman of the committee, emphasized the need for rapid action stating, “It is my
intention to hold these hearings in a continuous basis until we have finished with all of
the witnesses and then move into executive session for a markup of the bill.” 28 Pattman
continued, “When President Nixon sent this legislation to Congress, he asked that it be
acted upon so that it could be law within 1 week. As chairman of the Banking and
Currency Committee, I want to do everything possible to meet that time table since this
legislation affects the futures of thousands of people who suffered great losses as a result
of the disasters.” 29
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However, Patman also expressed his confusion in the President’s actions and
claimed that the President had reversed his own initiatives following his initial statement
by admitting:
While I support the principles of this legislation, I must confess
that I am confused about the method the administration has used to
provide relief for disaster victims. The bill before us today provides for
disaster loans to be made at a 1-percent interest rate and a forgiveness of
the first $5,000 of any loan.
Yet last March President Nixon sent legislation to the Congress
through the Office of Emergency Preparedness that would completely
remove the existing $2,500 forgiveness feature and make all loans at rates
far in excess of the 1-percent rate now advocated. Thus, in the space of 5
months we have seen a complete reversal of the administration’s position.
Even more confusing has been the role of the administration and
certain members of the President’s party in connection with legislation
dealing with disasters that was recently passed by the House by an
overwhelming vote of 325 to 9. President Nixon has set a 1-week
timetable for the enactment of his bill. Yet when we attempted to take the
disaster bill to the floor of the House under unanimous consent before the
last recess, we were twice blocked in our attempts to do so by a member of
the President’s party. These two delays meant that the bill was not passed
in enough time to allow the Senate to act on the bill prior to adjournment
and caused an unnecessary delay in providing financial help to disaster
victims. 30

While Patman’s comments shed light on the fact that he supported the changed
course of action Nixon had taken in the weeks following Hurricane Agnes, they also
hinted that Nixon’s expectation for bipartisanship and cooperation from Congress would
not be filled as it had been immediately following the storm in 1969. Instead, Congress
broke the paradigm that bipartisanship surged in the wake of a major catastrophe before
breaking in the interim and conveyed that Republican-Democrat partisanship in
Washington and the distrust between the Nixon administration and Congress would not
be swayed by the circumstance. As was mentioned, this was a dynamic that did not exist
30
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the last time the federal government needed to make an immense investment in disaster
relief and revise the legislative policy following Hurricane Camille in 1969.
Moreover, the hearing suggested a hardening of the partisanship and distrust of
the Nixon administration in Congress between 1971 and 1972. Just 15 months earlier, on
March 30, 1971, the House Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations met to
discuss a proposal by George Lincoln of the President’s Office of Emergency
Preparedness for urgent supplemental disaster funding totaling $25 million dollars. This
money was to go towards the relief effort for a major earthquake in California that had
struck a month earlier. 31 Following some routine questioning by the Subcommittees,
Congress appropriated the funds. There was no mention of criticisms towards the
President or the OEP throughout the entire hearing.
However, as the 1972 hearing continued it was clear that the increase in
partisanship over the past two years had prompted Democrats in Washington to become
more vocal in their complaints of the Nixon administration. Yet, this new political
dynamic proved to precipitate greater effects to federal disaster relief legislation than
simple criticisms of the Nixon administration’s actions throughout the hearing. In fact, a
partisan struggle on the provisions of federal disaster relief policy following Hurricane
Agnes had already emerged between leaders in Congress and the Nixon administration.
As the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report claimed, “In the wake of tropical
storm Agnes, which triggered devastating floods on the eastern seaboard, a push began in
Washington to liberalize disaster relief programs already available from some 20 federal
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departments and agencies.” 32 Specifically, the House Banking and Currency Committee
approved legislation on June 27, to reduce interest rates on government disaster relief
loans for both homeowners and commercial interests. This bill cut interest rates from
what was 5.12 percent to 1 percent if the loan was fully repaid or 3 percent if the
recipient chose to be awarded a forgiveness of $2,500. 33
The Committees’ bill was trumped by Nixon’s proposal to raise the amount of
forgiveness on disaster loans to $5,000 in his message to the Congress to July. However,
this initiative only escalated the partisan tension between Congress and the Nixon
administration and the frustration from leaders in Congress was evident in the hearings to
determine the provisions of the Agnes Recovery Act of 1972.
In particular, Democrats in the Committee were reluctant to give Nixon a pass on
reversing his legislative action from a couple weeks earlier, and following the statement
of Frank Carlucci, a member of the Governor’s Emergency Council who attended the
committee hearing as the spokesman for the President’s Office of Emergency
Preparedness, William Barrett, a Democrat representative from Pennsylvania, attacked
Carlucci and demanded answers for the President’s course of action. Questioning
Carlucci on H.R. 15692, the bill on disaster loans Congress had passed on June 27,
Bartlett stated that the Committee had contemplated proposing $5,000 forgiveness at that
time, but that they had kept $2,500 forgiveness because they had been warned that the
administration probably would recommend vetoing the bill. 34 Bartlett concluded his
question by asking, “What kinds of games are we playing here today, 2 weeks later?...I
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want to get the answers from Mr. Carlucci. Why do they come back here now, when we
offered the same thing on June 25, and now ask for the exact same thing that we asked
for before?” 35
Carlucci was quick to defend the President’s recent proposal on the matter and
responded to Bartlett’s question by stating, “We are not asking for exactly the same thing.
We are asking for temporary legislation directed at a particular disaster which has cause
unparalleled economic damage. We think that in the long…”. 36 Yet he was not able to
finish, in a uncharacteristically rude gesture, especially for a veteran politician like
Bartlett, the representative cut Carlucci off and demanded to know why, if the damage
was unparalleled, the Nixon administration was not exerting more federal funds to put
towards urban renewal and disaster assistance for victims. “Why don’t they ask the
House to adopt the Senate’s (proposed) $1.5 billion for urban renewal?” 37
Carlucci, was able to have the last word on the matter before the Committee
moved on, yet he squandered any opportunity to discredit Bartlett’s claims and convince
those present that the President had acted rationally and consistently in regards to federal
disaster loan policy, and could only restate what he had first claimed in his prepared
statement. After referring to this, Carlucci once again reasoned:
…we are concerned that if legislation, permanent legislation is enacted,
which grants very liberal grants and low, very liberal grants and low, very
liberal interest rates, we will destroy the incentives for long range flood
prevention programs. That is, we will encourage people to build in the
flood plain. We think in the long run we should move in the direction of
more emphasis on Federal flood insurance and land-use control. 38
Unconvinced, Bartlett and the Committee moved onto mortgage financing in the hearing.
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Federal disaster loan policy is undoubtedly one of the most significant pillars of
the federal disaster program. As Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report confirms,
“Perhaps the most widely used disaster relief program authorized by PL 91-606 (The
Disaster Relief Act of 1970) is the low-interest loan program.” 39 As such, examining the
partisanship that existed between the Nixon administration and Congress, especially
liberal members of The House Banking and Currency Committee, on this issue is
exceptionally telling of the overall political dynamic concerning federal disaster relief
policy following Agnes. It is clear from the argument over federal disaster loans that
there is a liberal vs. conservative mentality present during these hearings, whereby those
in the Congressional Committee are pushing for a broad and permanent liberalization of
disaster relief policy and the Nixon administration is promoting a tentative expansion of
federal disaster relief policy to facilitate the relief effort for Hurricane Agnes.
However, there is another variable present in the Nixon administration’s
motivation to assure that their proposals were implemented into the disaster legislation
and it is evident that this is that they wished to distinguish themselves from Congress as
the more productive force in creating effective disaster relief legislation to help victims.
This is obviously noticeable in the Nixon administration’s strategy to deliver a grandiose
message to the Congress proposing a number of expansive disaster relief provisions,
including some that they had previously opposed as was shown in the discussion of
federal disaster loans. Nixon also revealed this motive more directly when, in a message
to Congress on June 27, the President, “directed federal agencies participating in the
relief effort ‘to provide all assistance necessary to cut through red tape and get the job
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done.’” 40 Yet Bartlett’s hostility towards the Nixon administration in his response to their
strategy of proposing disaster loan legislation they had previously objected to also
showed that those in Congress were not willing to concede all of the glory to Nixon when
it came to this.
During this period the Nixon administration also faced partisan criticisms from
state and local government officials that had been affected by the Hurricane. In his
analysis of the ways the relationship between federal and state government affects a
disaster relief effort, May asserts that when the this relationship is turbulent, as was the
case in the aftermath of Hurricane Agnes, “state officials perceive that the outcome of the
‘philosophical wrestling match’ in disaster relief—between providing generous amounts
of relief and guarding taxpayers’ dollars—has been decided in favor of taxpayers.” 41 May
concludes his section on this relationship writing, “When cooperation is lacking, the
implementation of federal relief programs is delayed and the burdens of disasters are
prolonged.” 42
Following Hurricane Agnes, May’s assertions were best exemplified by Milton
Shapp, the Democratic Governor of Pennsylvania who led state officials in their
criticisms of the Nixon administration. In his testimony to the Congressional Committee
Shapp was also critical of some provisions in the President’s proposed Agnes Recovery
Act of 1972, and also focused on federal disaster loan policy stating, “The President’s
proposal to set aside $1.3 billion for the new loans for the Small Business Administration
to issue long-term loans at 1 percent interest, is a step in the right direction. But it won’t
solve the problem. His plan would be improved by adopting the proposals of Senators
40
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Schweiker and McGovern to raise the forgiveness level to $15,000, but even this will not
handle all the requirements.” 43
Donald Barnett, another Democrat who served as the Mayor of Rapid City, South
Dakota, which was also faced severe flooding in 1972, voiced complaints with Nixon’s
legislative proposals as well and pushed for more generalized relief, stating to the
committee, “When you are talking about $50 million worth of damaged homes and
businesses, individual grants of $2,500 - or even $5,000, as the President proposes - are
just a drop in the bucket. We need legislation to get these people as humanly close as
possible to where they were financially before the flood struck.” 44
Ultimately, the divide that had evolved between Congress and the Nixon
administration proved detrimental to efficient policy making. On August 2nd President
Nixon made another speech to Congress in which he declared, “As I stated in my
transmittal message, the need for prompt enactment of these aid proposals, aimed at short
and long-term recovery, is extreme and urgent. I asked the Congress then to consider and
enact them within seven days. Sixteen days have passed without final Congressional
action on the Agnes Recovery Act of 1972. I again urge the Congress to act immediately
because the victims of these disasters desperately need the help these measures would
provide. And they need it now.” 45 It would be another two weeks before the President
would finish signing his proposals into law on August 16, 1972. Following his official
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statement to the Committee during these hearings, Shapp voiced his disapproval of the
immediate federal response to Hurricane Agnes and directly criticized Vice President
Spiro Agnew stating, “At the beginning of the disaster, I was not satisfied with the
federal response. It is, perhaps, understandable that officials in Washington did not
quickly realize the dimensions of the tragedy. Vice President Agnew, for example,
claimed that I was ‘excitable’ and said that my initial estimate of over $1 billion in
damage and losses was “probably ridiculous.” 46
Unfortunately for Nixon, signing the Agnes Recovery Act of 1972 into action was
only the first of many hurdles for the President’s legislation. Not only was the Nixon
administration faced with partisanship in Congress but as the aftermath of Agnes wore
on, the President’s administration was confronted by hard criticism and partisan rhetoric,
led by Shapp, from victims in Pennsylvania. As complaints on the effectiveness of the
federal relief effort from Agnes victims and local politicians had already begun rolling in,
Nixon and Carlucci had hoped that their expanded legislation would quell the widespread
dissatisfaction that Agnes victims, especially those from the Wyoming Valley, were
expressing. However, New York Times reported that in response to this emergency
legislation by Congress, which would raise Small Business Administration loans from
$2,500 to $5,000 and lower the interest rate for loans over $5,000 from 5 ½% to 1%,
“Almost everyone in the valley, including many of the bankers and business leaders, feel
this is woefully inadequate. They say most flood victims would go hopelessly in debt
trying to finance new homes and refinance businesses” 47
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As Kashatus writes in Dapper Dan Flood, his biography of the congressman who
represented the Wilkes-Barre area, “frustrations were running high in the Wyoming
Valley. Although work crews had removed 75 percent of the flood debris by mid-July,
temporary housing in the form of trailers provided by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development was difficult to secure. Angry residents blamed the HUD
bureaucracy for their troubles.” 48 Reporting on this, a July article in the Wilkes-Barre
Times-Leader wrote, “The Federal government is ‘agonizingly slow’ in connecting
mobile homes and trailers to available sites, State Secretary of Community Affairs
William H. Wilcox charged Wednesday.” 49 The article continued to quote Mr. Wilcox
who claimed, “In short… The state of Pennsylvania is at least a month ahead of federal
agencies in providing land for trailer sites.” 50
Fueled by Shapp’s criticisms, Agnes victims’ disapproval of Nixon’s federal
relief effort only increased in the weeks following the catastrophe and as a result, they
followed their Governor’s lead and their rhetoric towards the Nixon administration grew
increasingly harsh. In Pennsylvania, which housed more angry victims than any other
state, the public constantly denounced George Romney, a Nixon administration official
who served as the secretary for the Senate Housing and Urban Development Committee,
especially when he conveyed that it was impractical for the federal government to cover
all damages. One newspaper article out of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, appropriately
titled, “Romney, Shapp in Shouting Match With Flood Victims” reported, “Trying to
outshout more than 25 flood victims, Romney said: ‘It’s going to take a combination of
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federal, state, local and private efforts to resolve this entire situation. The principle effort
is going to have to be private.” 51
Romney’s comments were only the first of many instances that highlighted the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as one of the primary targets for
victims to aim their criticisms against federal disaster relief in the months following the
June catastrophe. If fact, upon being constantly berated and antagonized by Agnes
victims throughout the moths following the catastrophe, Romney became a symbol of the
Nixon administration’s failure to properly deliver aid and relief to the affected areas. As a
result, HUD’s highly public failure in the eyes of Agnes victims and the media connected
the Nixon administration much more directly to the inadequacy in the relief effort for
Hurricane Agnes than had been the case for Hurricane Camille.
One of the most trying problems the federal government faced was that Hurricane
Agnes had precipitated the need for massive temporary housing throughout Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and New York. To address this, Nixon designated the task of transporting and
preparing nearly 10,000 mobile homes and trailers for flood victims to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Assigned to provide the temporary housing for flood
victims whose homes had been badly damaged or destroyed, almost all victims who
applied for temporary housing through HUD reported negative experiences citing that the
department was disorganized and inefficient.
While HUD’s temporary housing program was the most widely criticized facet of
federal disaster relief, both the SBA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also came under
fire by victims following the catastrophe. Many victims complained that the SBA was
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handing out loans based on preference as opposed to need. Those who made this
complaint felt that victims who were promptly receiving their SBA loans either had
connections in Washington or some other form of leverage with the SBA office. Victims
in Pennsylvania also voiced complaints against the U.S. Army Corps. Of Engineers, who
were responsible for contracting local construction businesses to set up temporary
housing sites and well as repair damaged buildings in the aftermath of the hurricane,
many criticized that the Corps was also distributing their funding in a biased manner,
accepting bribes from certain companies for their contracts.
Following the latest Gallup Pole, published on July 21, that reported a 19 point
lead in the presidential election for Nixon, in August 1972, McGovern toured through
Wilkes-Barre and gave a speech to Agnes victims there criticizing the President’s disaster
assistance. 52 Three weeks later, Nixon visited that same area and personally presented a
$4 million dollar check for a local college. The President also hosted a free picnic for
Wilkes-Bare residents, which 1,500 attended. 53 As the New York Times reported,
“President Nixon made a surprise visit to this flood damaged community today with a $4million check for a local college, an offer of free picnic hot dogs and a promise that
Wilkes-Barre would ‘come back better than ever.’” 54
The article also hints that Nixon had McGovern’s visit and the 1972 Presidential
election in mind when he visited Wilkes-Barre and reports, “At one point, the President
got out and shook hands with Frank Vivian, a railroad employee, who was drinking beer
in front of a heavily damaged house. ‘I know you don’t like his name mentioned,’ Mr.
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Vivian told the President, ‘but George McGovern was through here and my wife shook
his hand.’ Mr. Nixon inspected the house and promised Mr. Vivian that he would receive
a house trailer immediately for temporary living quarters.” 55 The gestures by both
McGovern and Nixon conveyed that disaster relief had become a viable topic for partisan
dispute and one of the major relevant issues to argue over during their presidential
campaigns in 1972. Peter May asserts that while presidents do not often visit disaster
sites, Nixon’s visit to Wilkes-Barre was certainly an effect of “election-year politics” by
the president to visibly promote himself as an empathetic leader who was working on the
front-line as the leader of disaster relief for Agnes victims. 56
Continuing to promote his proactive leadership back in Washington a month later,
on October 30, Nixon once again addressed the Congress with a statement about his
decision to sign additional bills that the House and Senate had passed. While many of
these bills did not directly stem from, or concern the Agnes relief effort, Nixon did
mention the catastrophe in his speech stating, “Among the many other bills receiving my
approval are…S.383, which helps restore and replace essential railway facilities and
equipment which were damaged during Hurricane Agnes and other natural disasters this
past June.” 57 The President’s message did not offer much insight on his mentality
towards the federal disaster relief effort throughout the summer and fall of 1972 or the
criticisms it had received. However, his mention of Agnes when speaking of the benefits
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of S.383 conveyed that federal assistance for Hurricane Agnes was still a high priority on
the President’s agenda at this point.
A better indicator of the Nixon administration’s mentality towards the federal
disaster relief effort after Agnes came days earlier on October 5, when the
Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations held hearings to determine
supplemental appropriations for the 1973 fiscal year. Following Romney’s disappointing
inability to gain the trust or respect of Agnes victims in Wilkes-Barre, Nixon had
dispatch Frank Carlucci, the deputy director of the Executive Office of Management and
Budget, in mid-August to guide the flood aid effort. As New York Times reported, the
President specifically directed Carlucci to, “cut through the red tape and get the job
done.” 58
Nonetheless, among those who spoke on behalf of increasing funding for the
Agnes relief effort was George Romney, who served as the Secretary of HUD.
Introducing Romney was Rep. Edward Boland, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
HUD—Space-Science-Veterans Appropriations who stated, “The Secretary is here today
regarding a request in House Document 92-368 for a supplemental appropriation of $250
million for urban renewal. This will provide a total of $1.450 billion when combined with
the $1.2 billion previously appropriated for 1973. It is proposed that $450 million will be
used for disaster relief to meet the needs of communities recovering from tropical storm
Agnes.” 59
Additionally, Kenneth Grant, an administrator of the Soil Conservation Service
(ASCS) within the Department of Agriculture requested appropriations for the Service
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totaling $16,500,000 based on needs for the Agnes recovery effort. In his statement to the
Subcommittees Mr. Grant asserted that had appropriated $10 million in “emergency
conservation measures” to be used towards the repair of private, individual farms. Grant
specified that $2.8 million and $3.5 million of this funding was being used to the
recovery efforts in Pennsylvania and New York respectively. Specifically, the money was
being used for debris removal on farms, pond repair, and repairs of other conservation
structures in the disaster-affected areas.
Moreover, Grant asserted that the ASCA also offered an emergency livestock feed
program to nine hurricane-ravaged counties in Pennsylvania. He claimed that
approximately $19 million had been provided by the Farmers Home Administration to go
towards rural housing and emergency operating loans. Lastly, grant also expressed that
under the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Nutrition Service had furnished
surplus foods valued at about $1.3 million, and $9.2 million of free food stamps to
disaster victims. 60
Grant continued to convey the massive expenditures that the Agnes federal relief
effort had required, claiming that in the wake of Agnes, “the Corps of Engineers, using
OEP funds, has let over 8,000 contracts costing about $85 million, about one-half of
which is in the Wilkes-Barre, Pa., area.” 61 Along with Romney’s request for
supplemental appropriations for urban renewal, Grant’s requests served as evidence for
the massive shift in attitude among congressman towards the much more expansive role
the federal government should play in disaster relief in order to appease the heightened
sense of entitlement disaster victims had developed.
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Finally, Rep.William Scherle of Iowa also brought to the Subcommittees’
attention to Hurricane Agnes when he spoke about the lack of flood insurance Agnes
victims had subscribed in. In his statement, Scherle declared, “Relatively few lives have
been lost but when the flood waters receded survivors often found they had little left but
their skins. Almost no one took the precaution of buying flood insurance. In WilkesBarre, Pa., for example, one of the region’s hardest hit areas by Agnes, only two people
had flood insurance when they were struck.” 62 Scherle continued, “The grim lessons of
Agnes and her sisters have not been lost on Government planners. The administration has
proposed an extensive expansion of the Federal flood insurance program and suggested
that homeowners in flood prone areas be required to buy insurance in order to get other
forms of Federal aid, such as mortgage insurance or loans from federally insured
institutions.”63
Following the dialogue in these Congressional hearings on the federal disaster
relief effort for Hurricane Agnes, it seems that the partisanship between the Nixon
administration and Democrats in Congress that was present at the time of the catastrophe
and in the first few weeks following it, up to the implementation of the Agnes Recovery
Act of 1972, had subsided. In an examination of the hearings for supplemental
appropriations for 1973, the dialogue hints at a unified effort between the Nixon
administration and Congressional leaders to expand the funding and effectiveness of
Agnes relief while learning from their mistakes and using it to improve disaster relief
legislation for the future.
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However, while criticisms of the Nixon administration coming from Congress
slowed, the partisanship between Nixon’s administration and politicians in the state of
Pennsylvania hardened in the months following Hurricane Agnes. In a Congressional
hearing to investigate the adequacy and effectiveness of federal disaster relief legislation
nearly a year after Agnes struck, Shapp continued to bash the President and his
administration for their relief efforts. In his statement to the Committee Shapp preached:
SBA, FHA, HUD, EDA, OEP – never have so many labored under so much confusion.
They came to Wilkes-Barre, to Milton, to Reading, to Lock Haven, and to all the other
flood-stricken communities with their own rules and their own priorities, behaving not as
if they were coming to a disaster, but to a massive opening of branch offices.
And even these offices were often opened against their will. We pleaded with HUD,
OEP, and other Federal agencies to join with the State in opening one-stop service
centers in each community, where people could get information on every agency and
services from all. The Federal agencies refused at first to cooperate. Each insisted on
having its own individual office. The Small Business Administration even went to the
extent of refusing to give the State its forms. Not until the State opened first 85, then 130,
information offices did they see the need and move in with us.
SBA and the Farmers Home Administration seemed to forget that congress had chosen
them to dispense disaster loans simply because they have the manpower and machinery
to do the job. Their zeal for protecting public funds would have been admirable if it had
not been so excessive. A disaster is no place for the mentality of a small-minded
banker…
Vice President Agnew called me “excitable when I predicted in the aftermath of the flood
that damage in Pennsylvania would exceed $1 billion. That was 5 days before President
Nixon called this the worst natural disaster in American history. Now that damages in
Pennsylvania have been estimated at more than $3 billion. I’m beginning to wonder if I
was not too calm. 64

Despite Congressional bipartisanship and their cooperation with Nixon in the aftermath
of Hurricane Camille, the 1970 U.S. Senate Election thrust a stake between the Nixon
administration and the Democratic Party that hindered their relationship for the rest of
Nixon’s time in office. However, the hearings immediately following hurricane Agnes
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convey the development of a softening partisanship in Washington and hardening
partisanship between federal and state administrations. This seems to point to May’s
theory that major disasters solicit bipartisan cooperation in Washington in their
immediate aftermath. If this is the case, examining the hearings following Agnes and
leading to the the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 should show a revival of partisanship in
Congress, and will be telling as to how much the partisanship in Washington was affected
by the immediate post-disaster situation, and how much remained engrained.

Chapter 4
After four separate hearings throughout five months during 1973, on the
effectiveness of current disaster relief legislation and what could be improved for the
future, the Senate Subcommittee on Disaster Relief announced their proposal for the
Disaster Relief Act of 1974, a bill to amend and improve upon the current disaster relief
legislation under the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974,
like nearly all domestic policy bills that had come in the past three years, was at least in
part molded by Nixon’s desire to procure as much discretionary power as president as he
could. This was, of course, a key part of his strategy to accomplish his desire to be seen
as a man of action, a leader who could start and finish large tasks swiftly. As such, he
crafted much of his domestic policy to facilitate this discretionary power. However, this
strategy was the foundation of what had generated much of the partisanship and hostility
towards the Nixon administration from members of Congress and liberal state officials
that emerged throughout Nixon’s time as president. Although the provisions of the
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 represented this interest from the President in federal disaster
relief policy, it spanned throughout his domestic policy in general.
In Nixon Reconsidered, Hoff writes of one particularly transparent instance of
Nixon’s grasp for executive authority in domestic policy during his time in office
involving the abuse of impoundments by the President. Hoff explains that during the
summer of 1974, Congress passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, a
bill which regulated presidential impoundments and more importantly, created the
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Congressional Budget Office, a new data-gathering department whose work allowed
Congress to submit its’ own draft budgets and thereby control spending ceilings. 1
Explaining this bill further in their essay on presidential unilateral action, Terry Moe and
William Howell contribute, “The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act,
passed in 1974 –during the same crisis period as the War Powers Resolution –was
intended to address, among other things the president’s unilateral power to impound
congressionally appropriated funds.” 2 Moe and Howell continue, “While this had never
been much of a problem with past presidents, Richard Nixon had begun making overt use
of impoundments as a way to influence policy, and Congress reacted with new rules
requiring presidents to get legislative approval and specifying exactly how and when this
was to be done.” 3
Hoff provides a background context and more detail on Nixon’s abuse of his
presidential impoundment privileges in her section of the Impoundment Control Act of
1974, explaining that in 1969 Congress had legitimized Johnson’s unilateral action by
granting Nixon discretionary power to impound up to $6 billion from domestic
authorizations that had been approved. However, between 1970-1971 Nixon had withheld
$12 billion without congressional approval and by the spring of 1973, he had withheld 18
million. Hoff asserts:
Consequently, partisan congressional opposition to impoundment began to
develop among Democrats in Congress even before Watergate, but
disagreement between the executive and legislative branches over
environmental appropriations reach such hysterical heights by 1974 that
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the House Judiciary Committee considered making
impoundments part of the impeachment charges against him. 4

Nixon’s

The revelation that Nixon had secretly withheld $18 million between 1969 and
1973 certainly contributed to the distrust and partisanship between Congress and the
Nixon administration that had influenced disaster policy and the Disaster Relief Act of
1974 so much. Moreover, this action by the President is telling that this hostility and
distrust between the Nixon administration and Congress, especially Democrats in
Congress, was widespread and affected all of his domestic policy actions, not just disaster
relief policy.
In his second State of the Union address in 1971, Nixon had put pressure on
Congress and challenged them to help him in achieving several expansions and revisions
of the current domestic policy. Addressing this agenda in his speech the President stated,
“I shall ask not simply for more new programs in the old framework. I shall ask to change
the framework of government itself –to reform the entire structure of American
government so we can make it again fully responsive to the needs and wishes of the
American people.” 5
Nixon masked his intent to restructure the balance of power between his
administration and Congress by optimistically framing his “call to change the framework
of government itself,” as a chance to evolve the federal government in a country that was
constantly evolving. Hoff also notes that much of this ideology for change expressed in
the beginning of 1971 stemmed the Nixon administration’s growing concern for the lack
luster economy that was present during this period and saw an opportunity to use the poor
4
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economic conditions as a means to propose grand changes in domestic policy. Hoff
asserts, “Nixon and his secretary of the treasury agreed in the spring of 1971 ‘to deal
dramatically and comprehensively with the ill health of the economy’ because ‘it was
simply good politics.’” 6 As such, Nixon spanned the majority of his domestic policy and
phrased his initiatives in a way that conveyed that his proposals would not only reinforce
the merits of the Great Society programs and make them more efficient by giving
executive authority to himself for immediate action, thereby eliminating the “red tape”
that had been a hindrance in enacting new legislation in domestic policy, but they would
also remedy the economy.
Nixon’s first goal as stated to the 92nd Congress was to complete the unfinished
work of the 91st Congress. Using this goal to convey the incompetence of Congress in the
past, Nixon applied pressure on the current Congress stating, “Over the next 2 weeks, I
will call upon Congress to take action on more than 35 pieces of proposed legislation on
which action was not completed last year. The most important is welfare reform. The
present welfare system had become a monstrous, consuming outrage –an outrage against
the community, against the taxpayer, and particularly against the children it is supposed
to help.” 7
While this goal promoted himself as a “man of action”, a leader who could
complete the big tasks necessary to succeed as President, it also referred to Nixon’s
controversial ideology and proposals for welfare policy reforms. This was first
highlighted by Nixon’s complete overhaul of the welfare system in his first years in
office with the establishment of his Family Assistance Program (FAP). Robert Lampman,
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who wrote on FAP immediately after it had been proposed by Nixon in 1969 asserts that
the President’s new program constituted, “(1) a greatly enlarged role for the federal
government in federal-state public assistance or welfare programs; (2) a new federal plan
to pay income supplements to all poor families with children, including those headed by
able-bodied men.” 8 Nixon’s Family Assistance Program marked a momentous gesture by
the President which conveyed that not only was he going to be a proactive leader in office
who was confident he could successfully revise the entirety of the current welfare system,
but also, that his leadership under the New Federalism ideology embraced postwar
liberalism.
In Nixon Reconsidered, Hoff comments on the Family Security System, the
predecessor to the Family Assistance Plan to call attention to the lack of loyalty Nixon
had exhibited to his conservative constituents from the very beginning of his presidency.
Exploring this initiative, Hoff cites Arthur Burns, a staunch conservative who served as
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve while Nixon was in
office. Highlighting the dissention within Nixon’s own administration on his action
towards the Family Security System Hoff highlights Burn’s complete disapproval of
Nixon’s actions towards welfare policy. Hoff writes, “Burns was infuriated that Nixon
did not reject the Family Security System idea outright. ‘It ran counter to everything I
knew about Dick Nixon,’ he said later. ‘It seemed that he might do the unthinkable.’” 9
She continues to explain that despite Burns’ disapproval, Nixon went ahead on this
program, and in fact, did so in secret so that he did not have to deal with the backlash of
his actions until they had already been implemented. Concluding on this, Hoff asserts, “it
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demonstrates how early Nixon committed himself to dramatic welfare reform, despite
substantive disagreements among his advisers.” 10
Nixon’s prerogatives on the Family Assistance Program and the Family Security
System program, serve testament to Nixon’s desire to establish himself as a man of action
who completed the tasks he set out to do within domestic policy. As further evidence to
this, Hoff expands on this notion and writes on Nixon’s chosen inner circle in relation to
it. She asserts, “After Nixon’s election in 1969 the initial momentum for change in most
domestic and foreign affairs came from such freethinking outsiders as Roy Ash, Robert
Finch, Pay Moynihan, Henry Kissinger, and later John Connally. All of these men
appealed to Nixon’s preference for bold action, and grandiose schemes.” 11
Following the continuation of Nixon’s proposals, which included goals
concerning lowering inflation, preserving the natural environment, and improving
healthcare in the U.S.; Nixon’s fifth goal called for expanded cooperation and support
between the federal government and state and local government across the country
stating, “The time has come for a new partnership between the Federal Government and
the States and localities –a partnership in which we entrust the States and localities with a
larger share of the nations’ responsibilities, and in which we share our Federal revenues
with them so that they can meet those responsibilities.” 12 In order to facilitate this, Nixon
proposed to Congress to make a $16 billion investment towards renewing state and local
government. Nixon stipulated that block grants, which would allow states to direct their
use of federal money, should be used to allocate the funding, with five billion dollars in
new and unrestricted funds to be utilized by states and localities as they saw fit and the
10
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other $11 billion to be provided by, “allocating $1 billion of new funds and converting
one-third of the money going to the present narrow-purpose aid programs into Federal
revenue sharing funds for six broad purposes for urban development, education,
transportation, job training, and law enforcement but with the States and localities
making their own decisions on how it should be spent within each category.” 13
Nixon’s call for Congress to make a large investment in block improving state
and local government was perhaps the most applicable of his goals for domestic policy to
federal disaster relief. Given the partisanship and criticism Nixon faced from both
Congress as well as state and local governments, the President’s initiative sided with state
and local governments, and his request for Congress to approve the funding to facilitate
the improvement of state and local government across the country not only
communicated a significant gesture from the President, but put the pressure on Congress
to make this happen as soon as possible. In doing this, Nixon was able to tip the loyalty
of state and local governments more towards himself. At the same time, Congress was
put in a position only to disappoint state and local governors with a lack of promptness in
their appropriation.
Additionally, by distributing the funding in large block grants to the state and
local governments, the Nixon administration rid themselves of the accountability to make
sure that the appropriated money was properly and effectively used. Hoff also notes that
Nixon’s proposal to utilize block grants was motivated by his desire bring about New
Federalism and decentralize many aspects of the federal governments domestic affairs
while in office. 14 Expanding on this notion, Hoff contends:
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Since the objective of Nixon’s New Federalism was to circumvent the
bureaucracy in Washington by increasing the power of the White House,
implementation of this goal naturally alienated a good portion of the
federal bureaucracy. The hostility between the White House and the
federal bureaucracy had already reached dangerous levels over Nixon’s
attempts to restructure the executive branch, and his New Federalism
simply exacerbated these feelings because certain aspects of it were
inextricably involved with organizational reform. 15
Overall, block grants as a key part of the New Federalism program also allowed Nixon to
successfully push for more executive power in disaster relief policy following Hurricane
Agnes a year later.
While these goals outwardly promoted cooperation between Congress and his
administration, just like in his disaster relief policy proposals, the evidence brought to
light by Hoff and other convey that Nixon’s discretionary actions in going about and
realizing these goals suggested that he really wanted Congress’s admission to his
executive power more than their cooperation. In fact, in nearly all of his domestic policy
proposals Nixon looked to ultimately gain leadership over Congress.
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 was first prompted by the aftermath of Hurricane
Agnes, and came after a comprehensive discussion of the state of current federal disaster
relief policy and several arguments on the best way to amend it. Throughout the hearings
both the President and his administration, as well as leaders in Congress continued to spar
over what they believed to be the most effective disaster relief policy. Nixon’s initial
proposals, however, were effectively taken off the table by those in the Subcommittee for
being too conservative, and ultimately, a compromise was made between the two sides.
Beginning the Congressional hearings in 1973 to discern what would ultimately
become the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Thomas Dunne, an administrator for the Federal
15

Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 67.

89

Disaster Assistance Administration, stated to the Subcommittee that he had asked the
President to fully review the existing disaster relief legislation and offer his suggestions
for any improvements that needed to be made based on his experiences declaring and
overseeing the relief efforts for 104 “major disasters” throughout his time in office.
Dunne continued that based on the President’s recommendations, Congress had
established that consolidating the authority and responsibility to allocate funds and
benefits, along with standardizing these benefits and removing all inequalities from the
handout process, and finally, preventing the misuse of those benefits were the primary
objectives of this new legislation. 16 Dunne completed his statement on the President’s
recommendations for the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 by stating:
The President added two further areas of concern as objectives of this
review: Reduction of future disaster losses through preparedness actions
taken before disasters occur: Encouragement of State and local
government and individuals to assume a proportionate share of the burden
of disaster preparedness and assistance—rather than relying almost
exclusively on the Federal Government. 17
After recognizing the president’s concerns, the subcommittee began discussion
the issues. One primary issue during the hearings that was brought to light was the
inefficiency of having over thirty different federal offices involved in the federal relief
effort for Hurricane Agnes. In his statement to the Subcommittee, Hugh Scott, a Senator
from Pennsylvania, spoke specifically about this issue in regards to Wilkes-Barre, the
hardest hit city by the storm. Promoting a “one stop shop for immediate needs”, Scott
declared:
The very fact that thirty Federal agencies were involved in the relief effort
is enough to understand the basic deficiency of that effort. There was no
one place where individuals could go for help. What was needed was a
16
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single location in the disaster area where sufficient personnel were made
available to provide local citizens and public officials information
concerning Federal disaster assistance in that area. 18
Thus, as Senator Scott’s statement served testament to, clearly a more effective
disaster coordination office was needed to properly consolidate the federal disaster relief
effort under one organizing office. Nixon to was also aware of this issue and proposed
remedying it in his suggestions to Congress for the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. This was
covered with his objective to amalgamate the authority and responsibility to allocate
funds and benefits under which he more specifically proposed the “streamlining of the
delivery of benefits through consolidation of authority and responsibility.” 19 During the
third of these hearings, Nixon’s proposal to manage all facets of the federal disaster relief
effort under a single agency received widespread support among the Subcommittee and
its’ visiting representatives. Commenting on this proposal, Pete Domenici a Republican
the Senator from New Mexico, advocated Scott’s sentiments and praised the President
stating, “In a recent message to Congress on the need for a better federal program of
disaster assistance, President Nixon noted that the ‘responsibility for relief is presently
too fragmented among to many authorities. At the federal level, disaster relief should be
managed by a single agency.’ I couldn’t agree more. In fact, I voiced those same
sentiments five months earlier on the Senate when I introduced my own bill to streamline
Federal disaster assistance.” 20
However, despite the support this suggestion received, throughout the hearings
the differences in vision between the Nixon administration and some leaders in Congress
was evident and theses two sides soon pitted themselves against each other when disaster
18
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relief policy was further discussed. Liberals in Congress pushed to expand the federal
disaster relief program even more than had been initially projected. Their stance came as
a response to the lack of effectiveness the expansions to disaster relief policy that were
made in the Agnes Recovery Act of 1972 had yielded; conversely, the Nixon
administration pushed back with a more conservative viewpoint and was reluctant to
generally expand disaster relief policy for all major disasters in the future.
On September 10, 1973, during the hearings on disaster relief legislation
Congress submitted S 1672, a bill greatly expanding federal loans for disaster victims, to
the President. Among other provisions, S 1672 increased SBA lending authority from
$4.3 billion to $6.6 billion, a relatively massive increase in SBA funding. Four days
earlier on September 6, the House had passed the bill with relatively little discussion or
argument. However, as the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report stated, “But William
B. Widnall (R N.J.), the ranking Republican on the Banking and Currency Committee
Questioned the ‘unbelievably inconsistent approach’ followed by Congress in restoring
generous loans after terminating the program only months earlier.” 21 The report
continued, “Warning that the President probably would veto the bill as drawn up by
conferees, Widnall argued that its disaster relief provisions ‘may be extremely costly, and
action on them should be deferred until we consider a comprehensive disaster relief
program.”’ 22
Just days later that same month, the Nixon administration delivered a glaring
symbol of its opposition to Congress’s liberal vision for a future of expanded disaster
relief, which was citied in the hearing from an article in the Washington Post. Introducing
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the publication, Governor Shapp stated to the Subcommittee, “There is one other point,
Mr. Chairman, that I would like to touch upon, which disturbs me greatly. This is in
today’s paper, the Washington Post. We received word of this about 3 days ago. It is a
small article.” 23 Shapp continued on to read the article, which described Congress’s
recently approved farm disaster credit program. The new program, which was to be
administered by the Farmers Home Administration, was now eligible for 447 counties
throughout 19 states that had been designated by Agricultural Secretary Butz. The
program offered emergency loans to farmers who had been hit by natural disasters
including floods and droughts. The article mentioned that notably, Maryland, Virginia,
and Pennsylvania were not on the list of states that had been designated by Secretary
Butz to receive the benefits of the program. 24
However, as Shapp pointed out, what was most important about the newly
approved farm disaster credit program was that it was a revision of a previous, more
liberal program that had been halted by the Nixon administration because “its generous
terms threatened to pile up heavy Federal costs”, as the article reports. 25 Upon being
halted by Nixon’s people, Congress’s new farm disaster credit program stipulated that
loans given to affected farmers carried an interest rate of 5 percent and must be
completely repaid. Additionally, recipients of these loans must first prove that they
cannot get credit from other sources. 26 While Shapp’s article served as a good source of
evidence to convey that the Nixon administration’s agenda for future disaster relief policy
was apathetic to the victims when compared to Congress’, his was the first mention of the
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farm disaster credit program in the hearings. While farmers who were affected by natural
disasters were in the minds of the legislators and state representatives, the focus was on
proper policy for disaster insurance for farmers, not loans.
Nonetheless, the dissention between the Nixon administration’s conservative
perspective and Congress’s liberal ideology towards the revision of federal disaster relief
legislation continued in other issues, and by the fifth hearing on disaster relief legislation
in September, the criticism back and forth had escalated. In a letter to Senator McGovern
that was shared with the Subcommittee, Donald Barnett, the Mayor of Rapid City South
Dakota, who was in the midst of dealing with one of the most catastrophic and deadly
floods in U.S. history after the Rapid City Flood of 1972 occurred in early June, declared
that he found every portion of the currently disaster relief bill to be objectionable. Barnett
claimed that his community, like every other one in the nation, would be in a terrible
situation if they were to face another disaster like the 1972 floods under the current
disaster relief legislation. 27
The Mayor continued by stating, “The only factor which can be stated about the
federal legislation as proposed under President Nixon’s law is that it would make
disasters much more painful to local units of government.” Furthermore, Barnett finished
his statement by asserting his belief that he would be “ridiculous” to lower the level of
federal funding on public services and facilities to 75% of its current level. He backed up
this claim by reminding the Subcommittee that in case of a major disaster, local
government did not have the financial assets nor the flexibility needed to subsidized the
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additional 25% of the federal government’s funding for the replacement of public
facilities and the re-establishment of public services. 28
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, who was the architect of the Disaster Assistance
Act of 1970 (the revision of the Disaster Relief Act of 1969), also took the opportunity to
rip Nixon and his administration. In his statement to the Subcommittee, Bayh claimed
that much of the new legislation in his view was retrogressive, and that this was due to
the federal government’s desire to separate itself from the federal disaster relief program.
Furthermore, Bayh claimed that the Nixon administration’s actions suggested that they
wished to relinquish any accountability involved in federal disaster relief efforts. At one
point in his statement Bayh professed, “For if there is any one central thrust to this bill; it
is to get the federal government as far as possible out of the disaster relief business,
especially where administration of the various programs is concerned.” 29
Bayh’s criticism of the new legislation not only reinforced the protest among
Democrats in Congress towards the Nixon administration’s conservative stance in these
hearings, but also deliberately contained a section on the narrow issue of the federal legal
aid program, a federal service designed to provide legal representation for disaster
victims, in order to deliver a more stinging jab at the Nixon administration than most
were willing to present. Finishing his statement to the Subcommittee, Bayh transitioned
from speaking on the broader issue of aid to federal legal aid asserting, “It is hard to
escape the conclusion that the real purpose of this section is to express in practical form,
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the Nixon Administration’s unrelenting hostility to Federal legal aid. But that is a
stricture that has no place in a comprehensive Federal program of disaster relief.” 30
Another topic that proved controversial throughout the hearings was the issue of
interest rate levels on disaster loans. This debate had continued to rage on with liberals in
Congress arguing that loans with low interest rate and forgiveness on disaster loans were
absolutely imperative to the effectiveness of the program while with those who supported
Nixon’s administration promoted block grants as a valid option for loans that would not
be so costly on the federal government. In an exchange with Republican John Dunne,
Quentin Burdick, the Democratic Senator and disaster policy specialist from North
Dakota argued his party’s side claiming that both Houses in Congress had recently passed
S. 1672, a bill which proposed that in regards to direct federal loans or guaranteed private
loans a borrower could have the option of either having the ability of $2,500 of their
loans cancelled if they were made at a 3 percent interest rate or having the entire loan be
made at interest rate of 1 percent with no cancellation. 31 Senator Burdick exemplified the
attacking rhetoric against the Nixon administration that had defined the aftermath of
Hurricane Agnes. Finishing his statement by questioning Dunne on title V, the Nixon’s
administration’s proposal for this issue he stated, “Is it the view of the administration that
the proposed grant program for needy families under title V would eliminate the need for
subsidization and cancellation features of present disaster loans?” 32
In response to Burdick’s inquiry Dunne stated to the Subcommittee, “The
provisions of title V on grants to the needy give special recognition that there are people
in this country who don’t have the ability to borrow money…What we are trying to reach
30
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through the need program by these grants are people who don’t have the ability to
borrow.” 33 Dunne continued to explain that in past disasters victims who could afford to
repay a loan were taking advantage of the system by claiming forgiveness on their
disaster loans and those who took large loans received both $5,000 that was forgiven and
a measly 1 percent interest rate on the remainder. 34 “The problem of overall forgiveness
and extremely low interest rates” Dunne claimed, “is that it is a disincentive for the
purchase of insurance. When you are making a man whole and you are going to refinance
his mortgage or his property at an extremely low interest rate such as 1 percent or 3
percent, what incentive is there for him to take an protective measures such as buying
insurance?” 35
It is particularly notable that Bayh and Burdick, the two disaster relief policy
enthusiasts who had devoted themselves so passionately to revising the Disaster Relief
Act of 1969 following Hurricane Camille both stood out in these hearings four years later
for delivering particularly hostile and partisan attacks against the Nixon administration.
This dynamic not only supports the argument that the alienation from Congress Nixon
had generated with his strategy to garner more discretionary power in domestic policy
permeated into federal disaster relief policy, but also, highlights the conservative
transition he had made in his vision of the federal disaster relief program between the
aftermath of Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Agnes. In the hearings leading to the
Disaster Relief Act of 1974, the Nixon administrations was arguing most turbulently with
the very same people they had praised for leading the effort to generate the Disaster
Assistance Act of 1970. Moreover, not only was this hardened partisanship evident
33
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throughout these hearings confirming May’s theory that the brief and acute presence of
bipartisanship immediate following Hurricane Agnes was merely and effect of the
catastrophe, but the attacks back and forth between Democrats in Congress and the Nixon
administration also drew out the proceedings leading to slow productivity in producing
new disaster relief legislation.
Ultimately, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 passed through both the house and the
executive branch and was signed by the President on May 22, 1974. As Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report states the final action on S 3062 (the Disaster Relief Act of
1974) came on May 15 when the House passed the bill by a recorded vote of 392-9; the
Senate had previously passed the bill on May 9. Congressional Quarterly reported that
the final version of the bill had generally followed an earlier version, which was
approved by the Senate on April 10. The House had passed their family grant program to
be included in the bill the next day (April 11) and sent it to the Senate to conference with
the broader bill. 36
The bill came at a crucial time of need for the federal government as just more
than a month earlier a super outbreak of tornadoes, primarily across the South and
Midwest U.S. had hit thirteen states. Collectively, the 148 confirmed tornadoes had killed
319 and cause $3.5 billion in damages. 37 Reporting on the newly passed bill,
Congressional Quarterly commented on this asserting, “Impetus to quick congressional
action on S 3062 was given by severe tornadoes which struck section of the South and
Midwest on April 4. The urgency for new legislation also was made apparent, however,
by natural disasters that preceded the 1974 tornadoes. More than $1-billion had been
36
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distributed for 111 major U.S. disasters in 41 states since enactment of the Disaster Relief
Act of 1970.” 38
The article also offered commentary by members of Congress on the Disaster
Relief Act of 1974 reporting, “Supporters of S 3062 said it was needed because of
deficiencies that had been found in the 1970 law, including bureaucratic snarls and the
lack of a program to aid economic recovery in disaster areas. They emphasized that the
desirable features of the 1970 act were retained in S 3062.” 39 Just as Nixon had attempted
to convey that Congress had proven itself to be incompetent and ineffective in enacting
helpful disaster relief legislation quickly in his messages to the American public,
Congress turned the scrutiny towards Nixon’s administration, specifically the OEP which
had been at the helm of the relief efforts for both Camille and Agnes.
The legislation itself represented a significant increase in the President’s
discretionary power during instances of natural disaster, which first included the sole
power to approve a governor’s declaration of a disaster area or emergency situation and
thereby appease their request for federal aid. Moreover, the bill stated that it was the
President’s prerogative to direct if, how, and when, the OEP should administer federal
disaster assistance. This assistance was concentrated within the following categories:
temporary housing, disaster loans, assistance in preparing casualty loss deduction forms
for federal income tax returns, legal services, consumer aid, disaster unemployed
benefits, crisis counseling, individual and family grants. 40
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Additionally, May notes that the 1974 bill authorized funding for mental health
counseling, and recovery planning councils, two aspect of disaster relief that had not been
considered up to that point. 41 Finally, the bill also provided the federal guidelines to
provide immediate assistance for “emergency measures necessary to save lives, protect
property, and protect public health and safety.” 42 These provisions encompassed
numerous services including debris removal, supplying food and shelter to needy victims,
unemployment assistance and special disaster loans with reduced interest rates, as well as
tax relief for victims following the disaster. 43
In his statement on signing the new legislation, Nixon explained that he had
submitted his objectives for the new disaster relief legislation and conveyed bipartisan
support for the result. Commending Congress in his message on the 1974 act, Nixon
declared, “The Congress, while altering the particulars of some of my proposals, has
incorporated in this bill the essential features of a sound disaster assistance program.
Combined with the Flood Disaster Protection Act that I signed into law on December 31,
1973, this new disaster relief law truly brings the New Federalism to our disaster
preparedness and assistance activities.” 44 Nixon’s reference to “New Federalism” once
again highlighted the central ideology in his domestic politics and within in his vision for
disaster relief policy that certain powers should be transferred from the federal
government back to state government, thereby reinstating a more traditional autonomy
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and power for state governments than the Great Society Program or FDR’s New Deal had
designed.
Ultimately, despite the fact that Nixon had promoted “New Federalism” from the
beginning of his time in office, Joan Hoff claims that even by 1974 the President was
unable to sell this ideology to the American public or garner much support for it. Writing
on this Hoff claims:
Designed to end the ‘pile on, political approach to domestic legislation,’ it
(New Federalism) never received the serious attention from the media that
the administration hoped for. As a result, reform did not become the
‘watchword of this administration,’ but it was not lack of coherent
domestic programs or a clear legislative agenda, as some scholars continue
to assert.
Nonetheless, despite the concessions Nixon had been forced by Congress to make
to the 1974 Disaster Relief Act, which included expanding the funding and resources to
be dedicated to disaster relief as well as enacting more forgiving interest rates for disaster
loans and permitting larger block grants to victims, the Administration was successful in
securing more power for the President in federal disaster relief policy. Nixon’s proposal
to have the President effectively be positioned at the helm of every decision while
working with one Federal Assistance Coordinator was well received by the Congress and
granted in the 1974 legislation. As we have seen, his success in procuring discretionary
power in disaster relief policy from the 1974 Act was one success in a larger effort from
the President to distinguish himself as a more effective leader than Congress was.
As the partisanship between his administration and Congress increased, Nixon
looked to promote this image of himself as a superior option than Congress, which he
framed as a slow and unproductive entity when it came to enacting new legislation and
improving U.S. domestic policy. Moreover, Nixon’s “New Federalism” ideology aimed
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to capture the impulse for liberation while channeling it in a different framework than the
Great Society program had. In doing this, Nixon hoped to amass more popular support
for himself among the American people and in doing so, garner more discretionary power
for himself and away from Congress and other federal bureaucracies.
In an encompassing retrospective analysis of Nixon’s time as President before his
impeachment in the Watergate Scandal, Joan Hoff reinforces this and contends:
Before Watergate, few of us paid much attention to one reform aspect of
the Nixon phenomenon: government reorganization based on his particular
administrative style…Nixon exhibited little interest during his
prepresidential career in what was to become almost an obsession once he
entered the Oval Office, namely, ‘to get working control of the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government.’ 45
Examining Nixon’s proposals and stance on the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and
comparing this more generally to the President’s stated goals and discriminatory action in
U.S. domestic policy, we can see that there is a clear correlation in his actions and
intentions in both. May, who reigns as the top scholar on the evolution and politics
behind federal disaster relief policy acknowledges this transitions of power in federal
disaster relief policy writing, “The mechanism with which federal assistance for any
particular disaster is trigger shifted over time as well. Congress had sole authority to, in
effect declare something to be a disaster during the era of disaster-specific legislation.
Under the more generalized legislation, the president was given that authority for the
disaster act provisions while the administrator of the Small Business Administration and
the Secretary of Agriculture were given similar for disaster loan provisions. 46
Continuing on this trend more specifically in terms of executive power May
asserts, “The president has the greatest potential influence upon relief assistance in that
45
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decisions the president makes about disaster declarations determine whether a given
disaster-affected area will receive major categories of federal assistance. Unless special
relief legislation is introduced, Congress has considerably less formal influence over
provision of disaster assistance for any particular disaster.” 47 Concluding his section on
the discretionary power given to Presidents in federal disaster relief policy, May explains,
“The discretionary power of the president to declare whether a given disaster-struck area
is eligible for federal assistance is a particularly unique aspect of the federal disaster
relief machinery.” 48 Expanding on this May hypothesizes on the potential abuses of this
prerogative and declares, “Given the discretion the president has in such matters, it is
reasonable to ask whether presidents have manipulated disaster declarations to serve their
political needs. The hypothesis that presidents make disaster assistance more readily
available in election years than in other years is specifically examined in this section.” 49
May contends that given the vagueness of the criteria to declare major disaster
declarations charges and concerns of favoritism and mistreatment have surrounded such
decisions by the president. May asserts, “A major source of much of this kind of
controversy over the declaration process, and one difficulty in making decision about
requests for declarations, lies in deciding whether relief needs for a given disaster are
beyond state and local capabilities and thus warrant federal assistance.” 50 May also
conveys, “A related source of controversy over disaster declarations has concerned the
type of events that are eligible for disaster declarations.” 51
After taking these variables into consideration May explains:
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to test the hypothesis that presidents make disaster assistance more readily
available in election years than in other years one needs the actual history
of disaster requests and declarations along with “objective” measures of
disaster severity for each disaster for which a request for federal assistance
is made. Unfortunately, the latter are not available for most disasters; only
yearly estimates of the value of disaster losses are compiled. Thus in
testing the hypothesis about election-year effects the best one can do is to
compared for each president the proportion of declarations in elections
years with nonelection year while taking into consideration the aggregate
estimates of disaster severity. 52

May selects presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, and compares the percentage of
governors’ requests for major disaster declarations during election years and non-election
years test his hypothesis. He claims that the data returned by doing this, “provides
empirical examination of the differences by showing the influence of various factors
upon approval rates.” 53 The analysis shows Nixon’s approval rate being statistically
higher than Carter’s as well as an “election-year effect”, as May terms it, for the Nixon
presidency, “involving statistically higher approval rates in election years than offelection years.” May asserts, “Similar effects were not found with such statistical
modeling of election-year effects for President Ford or Carter.” 54
Just as the President’s proposed legislation for the Disaster Relief Act of 1974
served to tip the balance of power from Congress and towards the President, deeming
him the ultimate overseer of federal disaster relief, Nixon’s secretive abuse of his
discretionary power to impound federal funds also highlights this same agenda in other
facets of his domestic policy. Moreover, evidence on Nixon’s high approval rate for
major disaster declarations, especially during election years found in May’s study also
suggests that Nixon used this discretionary power in federal disaster relief policy to once
52
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again promote himself as a man of action, a leader who worked quickly to help the
people with out the technical restrictions and bureaucratic red tape that might hinder this
aid he charged existed in Congress.
Upon examining the evolution of disaster relief policy between 1969 and 1974,
this study has give special focus to Hurricane Camille, Hurricane Agnes, President
Nixon’s political strategy in domestic policy and the background context of postwar
liberalism as the most influential factors to disaster relief policy during this period, which
intertwined to determine the course of its’ evolution. As was previously discussed, May
argues that expansion of the disaster relief program is primarily inspired by the immense
damage major natural disasters precipitate. Disaster relief policy consistently expanded
between 1969 and 1974 and consistent with May’s argument, it is clear that the greatest
instances of expansion, marked by the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970 and the Disaster
Relief Act of 1974, were directly derived from the relief efforts following Hurricane
Camille in 1969, and Hurricane Agnes in 1972. In both cases, the testimony given by
disaster victims, state and local officials, congressmen and members of the Nixon
administration on the relief efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Agnes and Hurricane
Camille served as both the primary shaper of how the federal disaster relief program
expanded during this, as well as the justification for why it needed to expand.
The background context of postwar liberalism reveals its’ influence in the
evolution of disaster relief policy during these instances as well. With the emergence
among Americans of a sense of entitlement for support from the federal government in
domestic affairs following the implementation of the Great Society, a mentality which
increasingly strengthened throughout Nixon’s presidency, victims of Hurricane Camille
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and Hurricane Agnes felt comfortable expressing their expectations for disaster relief
from the federal government that broke from the traditional role the federal government
had played in disaster relief. In turn, politicians from the local level to the congressional
level rallied for their constituents wants and as May concludes, “Over time, each of these
aspects of the general relief act were expanded considerably, evidencing the changing
congressional attitude about what constitutes and appropriate level of disaster relief.” 55
Keeping this in mind, Nixon’s own political strategy concerning domestic policy
was also consistently present, and influential in the course of evolution for the federal
disaster relief program. Nixon’s desire to be seen as a man of action, a leader who could
get the job done no matter how big the task, likely fueled his grandiose initiatives towards
the federal disaster relief effort following Hurricane Camille and his enthusiasm for the
Disaster Assistance Act of 1970, which expanded the federal disaster relief program and
normalized the protocol for large federal response to major disasters. However, in his
endeavor to gain notoriety as a proactive leader, Nixon also adapted a strategy to procure
as much discretionary power in domestic affairs as possible.
As Hoff asserts, Nixon enacted this strategy during his considerations for the
Family Security System program. Hoff writes that even with members of his own
administration advising him to reconsider, Nixon secretly went ahead with his liberal
initiative so that he did not have to deal with any opposition until the bill had already
been enacted. Reflecting on these two instances, it seems that Nixon’s desire to be a man
of action and get things done quickly superseded his loyalties to either the Republican
Party or his conservative constituency. Nixon hated any opposition to his proposals and
throughout his time in office, as he faced more and more of it from Congress as well as
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from state and local governments both in disaster relief policy and domestic policy, he
took increasingly brash measures to eliminate it. This is likely why we see a trend of
Nixon struggling harder to secure more discretionary power for himself in his later years
as president.
While Nixon pursued garnering discretionary power from the beginning of his
time in office, partisanship that began to emerge between Democrats and Republicans in
1970, led to direct criticisms of his administration in Congress, and seeming served as
catalysts to increase his desire to procure more discretionary power for himself and
become less cooperative with Congress in the subsequent years. These personal
criticisms, coupled with the partisanship between conservatives and liberals in Congress
and the differences in vision for the future of disaster relief policy between himself and
liberals, hindered the President’s ability to be a man of action and swiftly complete the
tasks he set out to do. As such, it appears that Nixon looked to gain as much power for
himself so that he did not have the deal with the opposition Congress presented and he
could quickly set federal disaster relief into action as he saw fit.
Nixon was able to escape the criticisms of the disaster relief effort following
Hurricane Camille relatively untarnished, thanks to the widespread charges of bias and
discrimination by non-profit organizations like the American Red Cross, and the
inefficiency and disorganization of the state and local level relief efforts. However,
throughout the federal relief effort following Hurricane Agnes, disaster victims directed
their complaints much more directly towards his administration. As such, Nixon
responded to this public criticism by attempting to transfer the blame to Congress,
reporting that the partisanship that had emerged in both Houses were hindering effective
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disaster legislation such as the Agnes Recovery Act of 1972 from being implemented in
time to truly help victims. This strategy once again aimed to promote Nixon as the actionoriented activist who was being hindered from enacting effective federal disaster relief by
a Congress that was engaging in trivial partisan politics instead of passing necessary
legislation. Nixon’s proposals towards the 1974 Act for federal disaster relief funds to be
appropriated in block grants to state and local governments so it that may be used at their
discretion promoted the decentralizing ideology of New Federalism, a policy platform
which Hoff claims facilitated Nixon’s gathering of discretionary power while in office.
Yet it also served to protect Nixon of much of the accountability that the disaster relief
funds be used efficiently; an issue that he had come under fire for in the aftermath of
Hurricane Agnes and narrowly avoided in the aftermath of Hurricane Camille.
Ultimately, promoting this image stance and in the disaster relief hearings following
Hurricane Agnes worked to support Nixon’s proposals to procure more discretionary
power in disaster relief policy, and this was reflected in the evolution of disaster relief
policy by Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which gave the president discretionary power to
grant major disaster declarations, and allocate relief money as he saw fit.
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